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In the problem of economic development, a phrase that crops up frequently is
‘the vicious circle of poverty.’ It is generally treated as something obvious, too
obvious to be worth examining. I hope I may be forgiven if I begin by taking a
look at this obvious concept. (R. Nurkse, 1953)
1 Introduction
Despite the considerable amount of research devoted to economic growth and
development, economists have not yet discovered how to make poor countries
rich. As a result, poverty remains the common experience of billions. One half
of the world’s people live on less than $2 per day. One ﬁfth live on less than
$1. 1 If modern production technologies are essentially free for the taking, then
why is it that so many people are still poor?
? This chapter draws on material contained in two earlier surveys by the ﬁrst author
(Azariadis 1996, 2004). Support from the Program of Dynamic Economics at UCLA
is acknowledged with thanks, as is research assistance from Athanasios Bolmatis,
and discussions with David de la Croix, Chris Edmond, Cleo Fleming, Oded Galor,
Karla Hoﬀ, Kirdan Lees and Yasusada Murata. The second author thanks the Center
for Operations Research and Econometrics at Universit´ e Catholique de Louvain
for their hospitality during a period when part of this survey was written. All
simulations and estimations use the open source programming language R.
Email addresses: azariadi@ucla.edu (Costas Azariadis),
j.stachurski@econ.unimelb.edu.au (John Stachurski).
1 Figures are based on Chen and Ravallion (2001). Using national surveys they
calculate a total head-count for the $1 and $2 poverty lines of 1.175 and 2.811The literature that we survey here contains the beginnings of an answer to
this question. First, it is true that technology is the primary determinant of a
country’s income. However, the most productive techniques will not always be
adopted: There are self-reinforcing mechanisms, or “traps,” that act as barriers
to adoption. Traps arise both from market failure and also from “institution
failure;” that is, from traps within the set of institutions that govern economic
interaction. Institutions—in which we include the state, legal systems, social
norms, conventions and so on—are determined endogenously within the sys-
tem, and may be the direct cause of poverty traps; or they may interact with
market failure, leading to the perpetuation of an ineﬃcient status quo.
There is no consensus on the view that we put forward. Some economists
regard institutions such as the state or policy as largely exogenous. Many
argue that the primary suspect for the unfortunate growth record of the least
developed countries should be bad domestic policy. Bad policy can be changed
directly, because it is exogenous, rather than determined within the system.
Sound governance and free market forces are held to be not only necessary but
also suﬃcient to revive the poor economies, and to catalyze their convergence.
Because good policy is available to all, there are no poverty traps.
The idea that good policy and the invisible hand are suﬃcient for growth
is at least vacuously true, in the sense that an all-seeing and benevolent so-
cial planner who completes the set of markets can succeed where developing
country governments have failed. But this is not a theory of development,
and of course benevolent social planners are not what the proponents of good
governance and liberalization have in mind. Rather, their argument is that
development can be achieved by the poor countries if only governments allow
the market mechanism to function eﬀectively—to get the prices right—and
permit economic agents to fully exploit the available gains from trade. This
requires not just openness and non-distortionary public ﬁnance, but also the
enforcement of property rights and the restraint of predation. 2
In essence, this is the same story that the competitive neoclassical benchmark
economy tells us: Markets are complete, entry and exit is free, transaction
costs are negligible, and technology is convex at an eﬃcient scale relative to
billion respectively in 1998. Their units are 1993 purchasing power adjusted US
dollars.
2 Development theory then reduces to Adam Smith’s famous and compelling dic-
tum, that “Little else is requisite to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence
from the lowest barbarism but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of
justice.”
2the size of the market. As a result, the private and social returns to pro-
duction and investment are equal. A complete set of “virtual prices” ensures
that all projects with positive net social beneﬁt are undertaken. Diminishing
returns to the set of reproducible factor inputs implies that when capital is
scarce the returns to investment will be high. The dynamic implications of this
benchmark were summarized by Solow (1956), Cass (1965), and Koopmans
(1965). Even for countries with diﬀerent endowments, the main conclusion is
convergence.
There are good reasons to expect this benchmark will have relevance in prac-
tice. The proﬁt motive is a powerful force. Ineﬃcient practices and incorrect
beliefs will be punished by lost income. Further, at least one impetus shaping
the institutional environment in which the market functions is the desire to
mitigate or correct perceived social problems; and one of the most fundamen-
tal of all social problems is scarcity. Over time institutions have often adapted
so as to relieve scarcity by addressing sources of market ineﬃciency. 3
In any case, the intuition gained from studying the neoclassical model has
been highly inﬂuential in the formulation of development policy. A good ex-
ample is the structural adjustment programs implemented by the International
Monetary Fund. The key components of the Enhanced Structural Adjustment
Facility—the centerpiece of the IMF’s strategy to aid poor countries and pro-
mote long run growth from 1987 to 1999—were prudent macroeconomic poli-
cies and the liberalization of markets. Growth, it was hoped, would follow
automatically.
Yet the evidence on whether or not non-distortionary policies and diminishing
returns to capital will soon carry the poor to opulence is mixed. Even relatively
well governed countries have experienced little or no growth. For example, Mali
rates as “free” in recent rankings by Freedom House. Although not untroubled
by corruption, it scores well in measures of governance relative to real resources
(Radlet 2004; Sachs et al. 2004). Yet Mali is still desperately poor. According
to a 2001 UNDP report, 70% of the population lives on less than $1 per
day. The infant mortality rate is 230 per 1000 births, and household ﬁnal
consumption expenditure is down 5% from 1980.
Mali is not an isolated case. In fact for all of Africa Sachs et al. (2004) argue
that
With highly visible examples of profoundly poor governance, for example in Zim-
3 See Greif, Milgrom and Weingast (1994) for one of many possible examples.
3babwe, and widespread war and violence, as in Angola, Democratic Republic of
Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Sudan, the impression of a continent-wide gov-
ernance crisis is understandable. Yet it is wrong. Many parts of Africa are well
governed, and yet remain mired in poverty. Governance is a problem, but Africa’s
development challenges are much deeper.
There is a further problem. While the suﬃciency of good policy and good
governance for growth is still being debated, what can be said with certainty
is that they are both elusive. The institutions that determine governance and
other aspects of market interaction are diﬃcult to reform. Almost everyone
agrees that corruption is bad for growth, and yet corruption remains pervasive.
Some institutions important to traditional societies have lingered, inhibiting
the transition to new techniques of production. The resistance of norms and
institutions to change is one reason why the outcome of liberalization and gov-
ernance focused adjustment lending by the IMF has often been disappointing.
We believe that in practice there are serious problems with direct application
of the benchmark story. First, for reasons outlined below, numerous deviations
from the neoclassical benchmark generate market failure. Because of these fail-
ures, good technologies are not always adopted, and productive investments
are not always undertaken. Ineﬃcient equilibria exist. Second, as Hoﬀ (2000)
has emphasized, the institutional framework in which market interaction takes
place is not implemented “from above.” Rather it is determined within the
system. Bounded rationality, imperfect information, and costly transactions
make institutions and other “rules of the game” critical to economic perfor-
mance; and the equilibria for institutions may be ineﬃcient.
Moreover, as we shall see, ineﬃcient equilibria have a bad habit of reinforcing
themselves. Corrupt institutions can generate incentives which reward more
corruption. Workers with imperfectly observed skills in an unskilled popula-
tion may be treated as low skilled by ﬁrms, and hence have little incentive
to invest large sums in education. Low demand discourages investment in
increasing returns technology, which reduces productivity and reinforces low
demand. That these ineﬃcient outcomes are self-reinforcing is important—
were they not then presumably agents would soon make their way to a better
equilibrium.
Potential departures from the competitive neoclassical benchmark which cause
market failure are easy to imagine. One is increasing returns to scale, both in-
ternal and external. Increasing returns matter because development is almost
synonymous with industrialization, and with the adoption of modern pro-
4duction techniques in agriculture, manufacturing and services. These modern
techniques involve both ﬁxed costs—internal economies—and greater special-
ization of the production process, the latter to facilitate application of ma-
chines.
The presence of ﬁxed costs for a given technology is more troubling for the neo-
classical benchmark in poor countries because there market scale is relatively
small. If markets are small, then the neoclassical assumption that technologies
are convex at an eﬃcient scale may be violated. The same point is true for
market scale and specialization, in the sense that for poor countries a given
increase in market scale may lead to considerably more opportunity to employ
indirect production. 4
Another source of increasing returns follows from the fact that modern produc-
tion techniques are knowledge-intensive. As Romer (1990) has emphasized, the
creation of knowledge is associated with increasing returns for several reasons.
First, knowledge is non-rival and only partially excludable. Romer’s key insight
is that in the presence of productive non-rival inputs, the entire replication-
based logical argument for constant returns to scale immediately breaks down.
Thus, knowledge creation leads to positive technical externalities and increas-
ing returns. Second, new knowledge tends in the aggregate to complement
existing knowledge.
If scale economies, positive spillovers and other forms of increasing returns are
important, then long run outcomes may not coincide with the predictions of
the neoclassical benchmark. The essence of the problem is that when returns
are increasing a rise in output lowers unit cost, either for the ﬁrm itself or
for other ﬁrms in the industry. This sets in motion a chain of positive self-
reinforcement. Lower unit cost encourages production, which further lowers
unit cost, and so on. Such positive feedbacks can strongly reinforce either
poverty or development.
4 Domestic markets are small in many developing countries, despite the possibility
of international trade. In tropical countries, for example, roads are diﬃcult to build
and expensive to maintain. In Sub-Saharan Africa, overland trade with European
and other markets is cut oﬀ by the Sahara. At the same time, most Sub-Saharan
Africans live in the continent’s interior highlands, rather than near the coast. To
compound matters, very few rivers from the interior of this part of the continent
are ocean-navigable, in contrast to the geography of North America, say, or Europe
(Limao and Venables 2001; Sachs et al. 2004). The potential for international trade
to mitigate small market size is thus far lower than for a country with easy ocean
access, such as Singapore or the UK.
5Another deviation from the competitive neoclassical benchmark that we dis-
cuss at length is failure in credit and insurance markets. Markets for loans and
insurance suﬀer more acutely than most from imperfections associated with a
lack of complete and symmetric information, and with all the problems inher-
ent in anonymous trading over time. Borrowers may default or try not to pay
back loans. The insured may become lax in protecting their own possessions.
One result of these diﬃculties is that lenders usually require collateral from
their borrowers. Collateral is one thing that the poor always lack. As a result,
the poor are credit constrained. This can lead to an ineﬃcient outcome which
is self-reinforcing: Collateral is needed to borrow funds. Funds are needed to
take advantage of economic opportunities—particularly those involving ﬁxed
costs. The ability to take advantage of opportunities determines income; and
through income is determined the individual’s wealth, and hence their ability
to provide collateral. Thus the poor lack access to credit markets, which is in
turn the cause of their own poverty.
An important aspect of this story for us is that many modern sector occupa-
tions and production techniques have indivisibilities which are not present in
subsistence farming, handicraft production or other traditional sector activ-
ities. Examples include projects requiring ﬁxed costs, or those needing large
investments in human capital such as education and training. The common
thread is that through credit constraints the uptake of new technologies is
inhibited.
With regards to insurance, it has been noted that—combined with limited
access to credit—a lack of insurance is more problematic for the poor than
the rich, because the poor cannot self-insure by using their own wealth. As
a result, a poor person wishing to have a smooth consumption path may be
forced to choose activities with low variance in returns, possibly at the cost of
lower mean. Over time, lower mean income leads to more poverty.
Credit and insurance markets are not the only area of the economy where
limited information matters. Nor is lack of information the only constraint on
economic interaction: The world we seek to explain is populated with economic
actors who are boundedly rational, not rational. The fact that people are
neither all-knowing nor have unlimited mental capability is important to us
for several reasons.
One is that transactions become costly; and this problem is exacerbated as so-
cieties become larger and transactions more impersonal. Interaction with large
societies requires more information about more people, which in turn requires
6more calculation and processing (North 1993, 1995). Second, if we concede
that agents are boundedly rational then we must distinguish between the ob-
jective world and each agent’s subjective interpretation of the world. These
interpretations are formed on the basis of individual and local experience, of
individual inference and deduction, and of the intergenerational transmission
of knowledge, values and customs. The product of these inputs is a mental
model or belief system which drives, shapes and governs individual action
(Simon 1986; North 1993).
These two implications of bounded rationality are important. The ﬁrst (costly
transactions) because when transactions are costly institutions matter. The
second (local mental models and subjective beliefs) because these features of
diﬀerent countries and economies shape their institutions.
In this survey we emphasize two related aspects of institutions and their con-
nection to poverty traps. The ﬁrst is that institutions determine how well in-
eﬃciencies arising within the market are resolved. A typical example would be
the eﬀorts of economic and political institutions to solve coordination failure in
a given activity resulting from some form of complementary externalities. The
second is that institutions themselves can have ineﬃcient equilibria. Moreover,
institutions are path dependent. In the words of Paul A. David, they are the
“carriers of history” (David 1994).
Why are institutions characterized by multiple equilibria and path depen-
dence? Although human history often shows a pattern of negotiation towards
eﬃcient institutions which mitigate the cost of transactions and overcome
market failure, it is also true that institutions are created and perpetuated by
those with political power. As North (1993, p. 3) has emphasized, “institutions
are not necessarily or even usually created to be socially eﬃcient; rather they,
or at least the formal rules, are created to serve the interests of those with the
bargaining power to create new rules.”
Moreover, the institutional framework is path dependent because those who
currently hold power almost always have a stake in its perpetuation. Consider
for example the current situation in Burundi, which has been mired in civil war
since its ﬁrst democratically elected president was assassinated in 1993. The
economic consequences have not been eﬃcient. Market-based economic activ-
ity has collapsed along with income. Life expectancy has fallen from 54 years
in 1992 to 41 in 2000. Household ﬁnal consumption expenditure is down 35%
from 1980. Nevertheless, the military elite have much to gain from continua-
tion of the war. The law of the gun beneﬁts those with most guns. Curfew and
7identity checks provide opportunities for extortion. Military leaders continue
to subvert a peace process that would lead to reform of the army.
Path dependence is strengthened by positive feedback mechanisms which re-
inforce existing institutions. For example, the importance of strong property
rights for growth has been extensively documented. Yet Acemoglu, Johnson
and Robinson (this volume) document how in Europe during the Middle Ages
monarchs consistently failed to ensure property rights for the general popu-
lation. Instead they used arbitrary expropriation to increase their wealth and
the wealth of their allies. Increased wealth closed the circle of causation by
reinforcing their own power. Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (2004) discuss how ini-
tial inequality in some of Europe’s colonial possessions led to policies which
hindered broad participation in market opportunities and strengthened the
position of a small elite. Such policies tended to reinforce existing inequality
(while acting as a break on economic growth).
Path dependence is also inherent in the way that informal norms form the
foundations of community adherence to legal stipulations. While the legal
framework can be changed almost instantaneously, social norms, conventions
and other informal institutions are invariably persistent (otherwise they could
hardly be conventions). Often legislation is just the ﬁrst step a ruling body
must take when seeking to alter the de facto rules of the game. 5
Finally, bounded rationality can be a source of self-reinforcing ineﬃcient out-
comes independent of institutions. For example, even in an otherwise perfect
market a lack of global knowledge can cause agents to choose an ineﬃcient
technology, which is then reinforced by herd eﬀects. 6 When there are market
frictions or nonconvexities such outcomes may be exacerbated. For example, if
technology is nonconvex then initial poor choices by boundedly rational agents
can be locked in (Arthur 1994).
In summary, the set of all self-reinforcing mechanisms which can potentially
cause poverty is large. Even worse, the diﬀerent mechanisms can interact, and
reinforce one another. Increasing returns may cause investment complementar-
ities and hence coordination failure, which is then perpetuated by pessimistic
beliefs and conservative institutions. Rent-seeking and corruption may discour-
5 For example, Transparency International’s 2004 Global Corruption Report notes
that in Zambia courts have been reluctant to hand down custodial sentences to those
convicted of corruption, “principally because it was felt that white-collar criminals
did not deserve to go to jail.” (Emphasis added.)
6 This example is due to Karla Hoﬀ.
8age investment in new technology, which lowers expected wages for skilled
workers, decreasing education eﬀort and hence the pool of skilled workers
needed by ﬁrms investing in technology. The disaﬀected workers may turn to
rent-seeking. Positive feedbacks reinforce other feedbacks. In these kinds of
environments the relevance of the neoclassical benchmark seems tenuous at
best.
Our survey of poverty traps proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews key develop-
ment facts. Section 3 considers several basic models associated with persistent
poverty, and their implications for dynamics and the data. Section 4 looks at
the empirics of poverty traps. Our survey of microfoundations is in Sections 5–
8. Section 9 concludes.
There are already a number of surveys on poverty traps, including two by
the ﬁrst author (Azariadis 1996, 2004). The surveys by Hoﬀ (2000) and Mat-
suyama (1995, 1997) are excellent, as is Easterly (2001). See in addition the
edited volumes by Bowles, Durlauf and Hoﬀ (2004) and Mookherjee and Ray
(2001). Parente and Prescott (this volume) also focus on barriers to technol-
ogy adoption as an explanation of cross-country variation in income levels. In
their analysis institutions are treated as exogenous.
2 Development Facts
In Section 2.1 we brieﬂy review key development facts, focusing on the vast
and rising diﬀerences in per capita income across nations. Section 2.2 reminds
the reader how these disparities came about by quickly surveying the economic
history behind income divergence.
2.1 Poverty and riches
What does it mean to live on one or two dollars per day? Poverty translates
into hunger, lack of shelter, illness without medical attention. Calorie intake
in the poorest countries is far lower than in the rich. The malnourished are
less productive and more susceptible to disease than those who are well fed.
Infant mortality rates in the poorest countries are up to 40 or 50 times higher
than the OECD average. Many of the common causes, such as pneumonia or
dehydration from diarrhea, cost very little to treat.
9The poor are more vulnerable to events they cannot control. They are less able
to diversify their income sources. They are more likely to suﬀer from famine,
violence and natural disasters. They have lower access to credit markets and
insurance, with which to smooth out their consumption. Their children risk
exploitation, and are less likely to become educated.
The plight of the poor is even more striking when compared to the remarkable
wealth of the rich. Measured in 1996 US dollars and adjusted for purchasing
power parity, average yearly income per capita in Luxembourg for 2000 was
over $46,000. 7 In Tanzania, by contrast, average income for 2000 was about
$500. In other words, people in Luxembourg are nearly 100 times richer on
average than those living in the very poorest countries. 8 Luxembourg is rather
exceptional in terms of per capita income, but even in the US average income
is now about 70 times higher than it is in Tanzania.
How has the gap between the richest and the poorest evolved over time? The
answer is simple: It has increased dramatically, even in the postwar era. In
1960, per capita income in Tanzania was $478. After rising somewhat dur-
ing the 1960s and 1970s it collapsed again in the 1980s. By 2000 it was $457.
Many other poor countries have had similar experiences, with income hovering
around the $500–1,000 mark. Meanwhile, the rich countries continued expo-
nential growth. Income in the US grew from $12,598 in 1960 (26 times that of
Tanzania) to $33,523 in 2000 (73 times). Other rich industrialized countries
had similar experiences. In Australia over the same period per capita GDP
rose from $10,594 to $25,641. In France it rose from $7,998 to $22,253, and in
Canada from $10,168 to $26,983.
Figure 1 shows how the rich have gotten richer relative to the poor. The left
hand panel compares an average of real GDP per capita for the 5 richest
countries in the Penn World Tables with an average of the same for the 5
poorest. The comparison is at each point in time from 1960 to the year 2000.
The right panel does the same comparison with groups of 10 countries (10
richest vs 10 poorest) instead of 5. Both panels show that by these measures
7 Unless otherwise stated, all income data in the remainder of this section is from
the Penn World Tables Version 6.1 (Heston, Summers and Aten 2002). Units are
PPP and terms of trade adjusted 1996 US dollars.
8 Some countries record per capita income even lower than the ﬁgure given above
for Tanzania. 1997 average income in Zaire is measured at $276. Sachs et al. (2004)
use the World Bank’s 2003 World Development Indicators to calculate a population-
weighted average income for Sub-Saharan Africa at 267 PPP-adjusted US dollars,
or 73 cents a day.
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Fig. 1. The rich get richer
income disparity has widened dramatically in the postwar era, and the rate of
divergence is, if anything, increasing. The vast and growing disparity in output
per person shown in Figure 1 is what growth and development theorists are
obliged to explain. 9
2.2 A brief history of economic development
How did the massive disparities in income shown in Figure 1 arise? It is worth
reviewing the broad history of economic development in order to remind our-
selves of key facts. 10
Although the beginnings of agriculture some ten thousand years ago marked
the start of rapid human progress, for most of the subsequent millennia all but
a tiny fraction of humanity was poor as we now deﬁne it, suﬀering regularly
from hunger and highly vulnerable to adverse shocks. Early improvements
9 Of course the ﬁgure says nothing about mobility. The poor this year could be the
rich next year. See Section 4.1 for some discussion of mobility.
10 The literature on origins of modern growth is too extensive to list here. See for
example the monographs of Rostow (1975) and Mokyr (2002).
11in economic welfare came with the rise of premodern city-states. Collective
organization of irrigation, trade, communications and security proved more
conducive to production than did autarky. Handicraft manufacture became
more specialized over time, and agriculture more commercial. (Already the
role of increasing returns and the importance of institutions are visible here.)
While such city-states and eventually large empires rose and fell over time,
and the wealth of their citizens with them, until the last few hundred years
no state successfully managed the transition to what we now call modern,
self-sustaining growth. Increased wealth was followed by a rise in population.
Malthusian pressure led to famine and disease.
The overriding reason for lack of sustained growth was that in the premod-
ern world production technology improved only slowly. While the scientiﬁc
achievements of the ancient Mediterranean civilizations and China were re-
markable, in general there was little attempt to apply science to the economic
problems of the peasants. Scientists and practical people had only limited in-
teraction. Men and women of ability usual found that service to the state—or
predation against other states—was more rewarding than entrepreneurship
and invention.
Early signs of modern growth appeared in Western Europe around the middle
of the last millennium. Science from the ancient world had been preserved,
and now began to be extended. The revolutionary ideas of Copernicus led to
intensive study of the natural world and its regularities. The printing press
and movable type dramatically changed the way ideas were communicated.
Innovations in navigation opened trade routes and new lands. Gunpowder
and the cannon swept away local ﬁefdoms based on feudal castles.
These technological innovations led to changes in institutions. The weaken-
ing of local ﬁefdoms was followed in many countries by a consolidation of
central authority, which increased the scale of markets and the scope for spe-
cialization. 11 Growing trade with the East and across the Atlantic produced
a rich and powerful merchant class, who subsequently leveraged their political
muscle to gain strengthened property and commercial rights.
Increases in market size, institutional reforms and progress in technology at
11 For example, in 1664 Louis XIV of France drastically reduced local tolls and
uniﬁed import customs. In 1707 England incorporated Scotland into its national
market. Russia abolished internal duties in 1753, and the German states instituted
similar reforms in 1808.
12ﬁrst lead to steady but unspectacular growth in incomes. In 1820 the rich-
est countries in Europe had average per capita incomes of around $1,000 to
$1,500—some two or three times that of the poorest countries today. However,
in the early 19th Century the vast majority of people were still poor.
In this survey we compare productivity in the poor countries with the eco-
nomic triumphs of the rich. Richness in our sense begins with the Industrial
Revolution in Britain (although the rise in incomes was not immediate) and,
subsequently, the rest of Western Europe. Industrialization—the systematic
application of modern science to industrial technology and the rise of the fac-
tory system—led to productivity gains entirely diﬀerent in scale from those
in the premodern world.
In terms of proximate causes, the Industrial Revolution in Britain was driven
by a remarkable revolution in science that occurred during the period from
Copernicus through to Newton, and by what Mokyr (2002) has called the
“Industrial Enlightenment,” in which traditional artisanal practices were sys-
tematically surveyed, cataloged, analyzed and generalized by application of
modern science. Critical to this process was the interactions of scientists with
each other and with the inventors and practical men who sought to proﬁt from
innovation.
Science and invention led to breakthroughs in almost all areas of production;
particularly transportation, communication and manufacturing. The structure
of the British economy was massively transformed in a way that had never
occurred before. Employment in agriculture fell from nearly 40% in 1820 to
about 12% in 1913 (and to 2.2% in 1992). The stock of machinery, equipment
and non-residential structures per worker increased by a factor of ﬁve between
1820 and 1890, and then doubled again by 1913. The literacy rate also climbed
rapidly. Average years of education increased from 2 in 1820 to 4.4 in 1870
and 8.8 in 1913 (Maddison 1995).
As a result of these changes, per capita income in the UK jumped from about
$1,700 in 1820 to $3,300 in 1870 and $5,000 in 1913. Other Western European
countries followed suit. In the Netherlands, income per capita grew from $1,600
in 1820 to $4,000 in 1913, while for Germany the corresponding ﬁgures are
$1,100 and $3,900. 12
Looking forward from the start of the last century, it might have seemed likely
that these riches would soon spread around the world. The innovations and
12 The ﬁgures are from Maddison (1995). His units are 1990 international dollars.
13inventions behind Britain’s productivity miracle were to a large extent public
knowledge. Clearly they were proﬁtable. Adaptation to new environments is
not costless, but nevertheless one suspects it was easy to feel that already the
hard part had been done.
Such a forecast would have been far too optimistic. Relatively few countries
besides Western Europe and its oﬀ-shoots have made the transition to modern
growth. Much of the world remains mired in poverty. Among the worst per-
formers are Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, which together account for
some 70% of the 1.2 billion people living on less than $1 per day. But poverty
rates are also high in East Asia, Latin America and the Carribean. Why is it
that so many countries are still poorer than 19th Century Britain? Surely the
diﬀerent outcomes in Britain and a country such as Mali can—at least from
a modeler’s perspective—be Pareto ranked. What deviation from the neoclas-
sical benchmark is it that causes technology growth in these countries to be
retarded, and poverty to persist?
3 Models and Deﬁnitions
We begin our attempt to answer the question posed at the end of the last
section with a review of the convex neoclassical growth model. It is appropri-
ate to start with this model because it is the benchmark from which various
deviations will be considered. Section 3.2 explains why the neoclassical model
cannot explain the vast diﬀerences in income per capita between the rich and
poor countries. Section 3.3 introduces the ﬁrst of two “canonical” poverty trap
models. These models allow us to address issues common to all such models,
including dynamics and implications for the data. Section 3.4 introduces the
second.
3.1 Neoclassical growth with diminishing returns
The convex neoclassical model (Solow 1956) begins with an aggregate produc-
tion function of the form
Yt = K
α
t (AtLt)
1−αξt+1, α ∈ (0,1), (1)
where Y is output of a single composite good, A is a productivity parameter,
K is the aggregate stock of tangible and intangible capital, L is a measure of
14x º 1
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Fig. 2. Deterministic neoclassical dynamics
labor input, and ξ is a shock. In this formulation the sequence (At)t≥0 captures
the persistent component of productivity, and (ξt)t≥0 is a serially uncorrelated
innovation.
The production function on the right hand side of (1) represents maximum
output for a given set of inputs. That output is maximal follows from compet-
itive markets, proﬁt seeking and free entry. (Implicit is the assumption of no
signiﬁcant indivisibilities or nonconvexities.) The Cobb-Douglas formulation
is suggested by relative constancy of factor shares with respect to the level of
worker output.
Savings of tangible and intangible capital from current output occurs at con-
stant rate s; in which case K evolves according to the rule
Kt+1 = sYt + (1 − δ)Kt. (2)
Here δ ∈ (0,1] is a constant depreciation rate. The savings rate can be made
endogenous by specifying intertemporal preferences. However the discussion
in this section is purely qualitative; endogenizing savings changes little. 13
13 See, for example, Brock and Mirman (1972) or Nishimura and Stachurski (2004)
for discussion of dynamics when savings is chosen optimally.
15If, for example, labor L is undiﬀerentiated and grows at exogenous rate n,
and if productivity A is also exogenous and grows at rate γ, then the law of
motion for capital per eﬀective worker kt := Kt/(AtLt) is given by
kt+1 =
skα
t ξt+1 + (1 − δ)kt
θ
=: G(kt,ξt+1), (3)
where θ := 1 + n + γ. The evolution of output per eﬀective worker Yt/(AtLt)
and output per capita Yt/Lt are easily recovered from (1) and (3).
Because of diminishing returns, capital poor countries will extract greater
marginal returns from each unit of capital stock invested than will countries
with plenty of capital. The result is convergence to a long-run outcome which
depends only on fundamental primitives (as opposed to beliefs, say, or histor-
ical conditions).
Figure 2 shows the usual deterministic global convergence result for this model
when the shock ξ is suppressed. The steady state level of capital per eﬀective
worker is kb. Figure 3 illustrates stochastic convergence with three simulated
series from the law of motion (3), one with low initial income, one with medium
initial income and one with high initial income. Part (a) of the ﬁgure gives the
logarithm of output per eﬀective worker, while (b) is the logarithm of output
per worker. All three economies converge to the balanced growth path. 14
Average convergence of the sample paths for (kt)t≥0 and income is mirrored
by convergence in probabilistic laws. Consider for example the sequence of
marginal distributions (ψt)t≥0 corresponding to the sequence of random vari-
ables (kt)t≥0. Suppose for simplicity that the sequence of shocks is independent,
identically distributed and lognormal; and that k0 > 0. It can then be shown
that (a) the distribution ψt is a density for all t ≥ 1, and (b) the sequence
(ψt)t≥0 obeys the recursion
ψt+1(k
0) =
Z ∞
0
Γ(k,k
0)ψt(k)dk, for all t ≥ 1, (4)
where the stochastic kernel Γ in (4) has the interpretation that Γ(k,·) is the
probability density for kt+1 = G(kt,ξt+1) when kt is taken as given and equal
to k. 15 The interpretation of (4) is straightforward. It says (heuristically) that
14 In the simulation the sequence of shocks (ξt)t≥0 is lognormal, independent and
identically distributed. The parameters are α = 0.3, A0 = 100, γ = .025, n = 0,
s = 0.2, δ = 0.1, and lnξ ∼ N(0,0.1). Here and in all of what follows X ∼ N(µ,σ)
means that X is normally distributed with mean µ and standard deviation σ.
15 See the technical appendix for details.
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Fig. 3. Convergence to the balanced growth path
ψt+1(k0), the probability that k takes the value k0 next period, is equal to the
probability of taking value k0 next period given that the current state is k,
summed across all k, and weighted by ψt(k)dk, which is the probability that
the current state actually takes the value k.
Here the conditional distribution Γ(k,·) of kt+1 given kt = k is easily calculated
from (3) and the familiar change-of-variable rule that if ξ is a random variable
with density ϕ and Y = h(ξ), where h is smooth and strictly monotone, then
Y has density ϕ(h−1(y)) · [dh−1(y)/dy]. Applying this rule to (3) we get
Γ(k,k
0) := ϕ
"
θk0 − (1 − δ)k
skα
#
θ
skα, (5)
where ϕ is the lognormal density of the productivity shock ξ. 16
All Markov processes have the property that the sequences of marginal distri-
butions they generate satisﬁes a recursion in the form of (4) for some stochas-
tic kernel Γ. 17 Although the state variables usually do not themselves become
16 Precisely, z 7→ ϕ(z) is this density when z > 0 and is equal to zero when z ≤ 0.
17 See the technical appendix for deﬁnitions. Note that we are working here with
processes that generate sequences of densities. If the marginal distributions are not
densities, and the conditional distribution contained in Γ is not a density, then the
17stationary (due to the ongoing presence of noise), the sequence of probabilities
(ψt)t≥0 may. In particular, the following behavior is sometimes observed:
Deﬁnition 3.1 (Ergodicity) Let a growth model be deﬁned by some stochas-
tic kernel Γ, and let (ψt)t≥0 be the corresponding sequence of marginal distri-
butions generated by (4). The model is called ergodic if there is a unique
probability distribution ψ∗ supported on (0,∞) with the property that (i)
ψ
∗(k
0) =
Z ∞
0
Γ(k,k
0)ψ
∗(k)dk for all k
0;
and (ii) the sequence (ψt)t≥0 of marginal distributions for the state variable
satisﬁes ψt → ψ∗ as t → ∞ for all non-zero initial states. 18
It is easy to see that (i) and (4) together imply that if ψt = ψ∗ (that is,
kt ∼ ψ∗), then ψt+1 = ψ∗ (that is, kt+1 ∼ ψ∗) also holds (and if this is the
case then kt+2 ∼ ψ∗ follows, and so on). A distribution with this property is
called a stationary distribution, or ergodic distribution, for the Markov chain.
Property (ii) says that, conditional on a strictly positive initial stock of capital,
the marginal distribution of the stock converges in the long run to the ergodic
distribution.
Under the current assumptions it is relatively straightforward to prove that
the Solow process (3) is ergodic. (See the technical appendix for more details.)
Figures 4 and 5 show convergence in the neoclassical model (3) to the ergodic
distribution ψ∗. In each of the two ﬁgures an initial distribution ψ0 has been
chosen arbitrarily. Since the process is ergodic, in both ﬁgures the sequence
of marginal distributions (ψt)t≥0 converges to the same ergodic distribution
ψ∗. This distribution ψ∗ is determined purely by fundamentals, such as the
propensity to save, the rate of capital depreciation and fertility. 19
formula (4) needs to be modiﬁed accordingly. See the technical appendix. Other
references include Stokey, Lucas and Prescott (1989), Futia (1982) and Stachurski
(2004).
18 Convergence refers here to that of measures in the total variation norm, which in
this case is just the L1 norm. Convergence in the norm topology implies convergence
in distribution in the usual sense.
19 The algorithms and code for computing marginal and ergodic distributions are
available from the authors. All ergodic distributions are calculated using Glynn
and Henderson’s (2001) look-ahead estimator. Marginals are calculated using a
variation of this estimator constructed by the authors. The parameters in (3) are
chosen—rather arbitrarily—as α = 0.3, γ = .02, n = 0, s = 0.2, δ = 1, and
lnξ ∼ N(3.6,0.11).
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Notice in Figures 4 and 5 how initial diﬀerences are moderated under the
convex neoclassical transition rule. We will see that, without convexity, initial
diﬀerences often persist, and may well be ampliﬁed as the system evolves
through time.
193.2 Convex neoclassical growth and the data
The convex neoclassical growth model described in the previous section pre-
dicts that per capita incomes will diﬀer across countries with diﬀerent rates
of physical and human capital formation or fertility. Can the model provide a
reasonable explanation then for the fact that per capita income in the US is
more than 70 times that in Tanzania or Malawi?
The short answer to this question is no. First, rates at which people accu-
mulate reproducible factors of production or have children (fertility rates) are
endogenous—in fact they are choice variables. To the extent that factor accu-
mulation and fertility are important, we need to know why some individuals
and societies make choices that lead them into poverty. For poverty is suﬀering,
and, all things being equal, few people will choose it.
This same observation leads us to suspect that the choices facing individuals in
rich countries and those facing individuals in poor countries are very diﬀerent.
In poor countries, the choices that collectively would drive modern growth—
innovation, investment in human and physical capital, etc.—must be perceived
by individuals as worse than those which collectively lead to the status quo. 20
A second problem for the convex neoclassical growth model as an explanation
of level diﬀerences is that even when we regard accumulation and fertility
rates as exogenous, they must still account for all variation in income per
capita across countries. However, as many economists have pointed out, the
diﬀerences in savings and fertility rates are not large enough to explain real
income per capita ratios in the neighborhood of 70 or 100. A model ascribing
output variation to these few attributes alone is insuﬃcient. A cotton farmer
in the US does not produce more cotton than a cotton farmer in Mali simply
because he has saved more cotton seed. The production techniques used in
these two countries are utterly diﬀerent, from land clearing to furrowing to
planting to irrigation and to harvest. A model which does not address the
vast diﬀerences in production technology across countries cannot explain the
observed diﬀerences in output.
Let us very brieﬂy review the quantitative version of this argument. 21 To
20 For this reason, endogenizing savings by specifying preferences is not very helpful,
because to get poverty in optimal growth models we must assume that the poor are
poor because they prefer poverty.
21 The review is brief because there are many good sources. See, for example, Lucas
(1990), King and Rebelo (1993), Prescott (1998), Hall and Jones (1999) or Easterly
20begin, recall the aggregate production function (1), which is repeated here for
convenience:
Yt = K
α
t (AtLt)
1−αξt+1. (6)
All of the components are more or less observable besides At and the shock. 22
Hall and Jones (1999) conducted a simple growth accounting study by col-
lecting data on the observable components for the year 1988. They calculate
that the geometric average of output per worker for the 5 richest countries in
their sample was 31.7 times that of the 5 poorest countries. Taking L to be a
measure of human capital, variation in the two inputs L and K contributed
only factors of 2.2 and 1.8 respectively. This leaves all the remaining variation
in the productivity term A. 23
This is not a promising start for the neoclassical model as a theory of level
diﬀerences. Essentially, it says that there is no single map from total inputs
to aggregate output that holds for every country. Why might this be the
case? We know that the aggregate production function is based on a great
deal of theory. Output is maximal for a given set of inputs because of perfect
competition among ﬁrms. Free entry, convex technology relative to market
size, price taking and proﬁt maximization mean that the best technologies are
used—and used eﬃciently. Clearly some aspect of this theory must deviate
signiﬁcantly from reality.
Now consider how this translates into predictions about level diﬀerences in
income per capita. When the shock is suppressed (ξt = 1 for all t), output per
capita converges to the balanced path
yt :=
Yt
Lt
= At(s/κ)
α/(1−α), (7)
where κ := n + γ + δ. 24 Suppose at ﬁrst that the path for the productivity
residual is the same in all countries. That is, Ai
t = A
j
t for all i,j and t. In this
and Levine (2000).
22 The parameter α is the share of capital in the national accounts. Human capital
can be estimated by collecting data on total labor input, schooling, and returns to
each year of schooling as a measure of its productivity.
23 The domestic production shocks (ξt)t≥0 are not the source of the variation. This
is because they are very small relative to the diﬀerences in incomes across countries,
and, by deﬁnition, not persistent. (Recall that in our model they are innovations to
the permanent component (At)t≥0.)
24 When considering income levels it is necessary to assume that countries are in
the neighborhood of the balanced path, for this is where the model predicts they
will be. Permitting them to be “somewhere else” is not a theory of variations in
income levels.
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Fig. 6. Investment rates in Tanzania and the US
case, the ratio of output per capita in country i relative to that in country j
is constant and equal to
yi
yj =
 
siκj
sjκi
!α/(1−α)
. (8)
The problem for the neoclassical model is that the term inside the brackets
is usually not very large. For example, if we compare the US and Tanzania,
say, and if we identify capital with physical capital, then average investment
as a fraction of GDP between 1960 and 2000 was about 0.2 in the US and
0.24 in Tanzania. (Although the rate in Tanzania varied a great deal around
this average. See Figure 6.) The average population growth rates over this
period were about 0.01 and 0.03 respectively. Since Ai
t = A
j
t for all t we have
γi = γj. Suppose that this rate is 0.02, say, and that δi = δj = 0.05. This
gives siκj/(sjκi) h 1. Since payments to factors of production suggest that
α/(1 − α) is neither very large nor very small, output per worker in the two
countries is predicted to be roughly equal.
This is only an elementary calculation. The computation of investment rates
in Tanzania is not very reliable. There are issues in terms of the relative
ratios of consumption and investment good prices in the two countries which
may distort the data. Further, we have not included intangible capital—most
notably human capital. The rate of investment in human capital and training
22in the US is larger than it is in Tanzania. Nevertheless, it is diﬃcult to get
the term in (8) to contribute a factor of much more than 4 or 5—certainly not
70. 25
However the calculations are performed, it turns out that to explain the ratio
of incomes in countries such as Tanzania and the US, productivity residuals
must absorb most of the variation. In other words, the convex neoclassical
growth model cannot be reconciled with the cross-country income data unless
we leave most of the variation in income to an unexplained residual term
about which we have no quantitative theory. And surely any scientiﬁc theory
can explain any given phenomenon by adopting such a strategy.
Diﬀerent authors have made this same point in diﬀerent ways. Lucas (1990)
points out that if factor input diﬀerences are large enough to explain cross-
country variations in income, the returns to investment in physical and human
capital in poor countries implied by the model will be huge compared to
those found in the rich. In fact they are not. Also, productivity residuals are
growing quickly in countries like the US. 26 On the other hand, in countries
like Tanzania, growth in the productivity residual has been very small. 27 Yet
the convex neoclassical model provides no theory on why these diﬀerent rates
of growth in productivity should hold.
On balance, the importance of productivity residuals suggests that the poor
countries are not rich because for one reason or another they have failed or
not been able to adopt modern techniques of production. In fact production
technology in the poorest countries is barely changing. In West Africa, for
example, almost 100% of the increase in per capita food output since 1960 has
come from expansion of harvest area (Baker 2004). On the other hand, the
rich countries are becoming ever richer because of continued innovation.
25 See in particular Prescott (1998) for detailed calculations. He concludes that con-
vex neoclassical growth theory “fails as a theory of international income diﬀerences,
even after the concept of capital is broadened to include human and other forms
of intangible capital. It fails because diﬀerences in savings rates cannot account for
the great disparity in per capita incomes unless investment in intangible capital is
implausibly large.”
26 One can compute this directly, or infer it from the fact that interest rates in the
US have shown no secular trend over the last century, in which case transitional
dynamics can explain little, and therefore growth in output per worker and growth
in the residual can be closely identiﬁed (King and Rebelo 1993).
27 Again, this can be computed directly, or inferred from the fact that if it had been
growing at a rate similar to the US, then income in Tanzania would have been at
impossibly low levels in the recent past (Pritchett 1997).
23Of course this only pushes the question one step back. Technological change is
only a proximate cause of diverging incomes. What economists need to explain
is why production technology has improved so quickly in the US or Japan, say,
and comparatively little in countries such as Tanzania, Mali and Senegal.
We end this section with some caveats. First, the failure of the simple convex
neoclassical model does not imply the existence of poverty traps. For example,
we may discover successful theories that predict very low levels of the resid-
ual based on exogenous features which tend to characterize poor countries.
(Although it may turn out that, depending on what one is prepared to call
exogenous, the map from fundamentals to outcomes is not uniquely deﬁned.
In other words, there are multiple equilibria. In Section 4.2 some evidence is
presented on this point.)
Further, none of the discussion in this section seeks to deny that factor accu-
mulation matters. Low rates of factor accumulation are certainly correlated
with poor performance, and we do not wish to enter the “factor accumula-
tion versus technology” debate—partly because this is viewed as a contest
between neoclassical and “endogenous” growth models, which is tangential
to our interests, and partly because technology and factor accumulation are
clearly interrelated: technology drives capital formation and investment boosts
productivity. 28
Finally, it should be emphasized that our ability to reject the elementary
convex neoclassical growth model as a theory of level diﬀerences between rich
and poor countries is precisely because of its ﬁrm foundations in theory and
excellent quantitative properties. All of the poverty trap models we present
in this survey provide far less in terms of quantitative, testable restrictions
that can be confronted with the data. The power of a model depends on its
falsiﬁability, not its potential to account for every data set.
3.3 Poverty traps: historical self-reinforcement
How then are we to explain the great variation in cross-country incomes such
as shown in Figure 1? In the introduction we discussed some deviations from
the neoclassical benchmark which can potentially account for this variation
by endogenously reinforcing small initial diﬀerences. Before going into the
28 However, as we stressed at the beginning of this section, to the extent that factor
accumulation is important it may in fact turn out that low accumulation rates are
mere symptoms of poverty, not causes.
24speciﬁcs of diﬀerent feedback mechanisms, this section formulates the ﬁrst of
two abstract poverty trap models. For both models a detailed investigation of
microfoundations is omitted. Instead, our purpose is to establish a framework
for the questions poverty traps raise about dynamics, and for their observable
implications in terms of the cross-country income data.
The ﬁrst model—a variation on the convex neoclassical growth model dis-
cussed in Section 3.1—is loosely based on Romer (1986) and Azariadis and
Drazen (1990). It exempliﬁes what Mookherjee and Ray (2001) have called
historical self-reinforcement, a process whereby initial conditions of the en-
dogenous variables can shape long run outcomes. Leaving aside all serious
complications for the moment, let us ﬁx at s > 0 the savings rate, and at
zero the rates of exogenous technological progress γ and population growth
n. Let all labor be undiﬀerentiated and normalize its total mass to 1, so that
k represents both aggregate capital and capital per worker. Suppose that the
productivity parameter A can vary with the stock of capital. In other words,
A is a function of k, and aggregate returns kt 7→ A(kt)kα
t are potentially
increasing. 29
The law of motion for the economy is then
kt+1 = sA(kt)k
α
t ξt+1 + (1 − δ)kt. (9)
Depending on the speciﬁcation of the relationship between k and productivity,
many dynamic paths are possible. Some of them will lead to poverty traps.
Figure 7 gives examples of potential dynamic structures. For now the shock ξ
is suppressed. The x-axis is current capital kt and the y-axis is kt+1. In each
case the plotted curve is just the right hand side of (9), all with diﬀerent maps
k 7→ A(k).
In part (a) of the ﬁgure the main feature is non-ergodic dynamics: long run
outcomes depend on the initial condition. Speciﬁcally, there are two local at-
tractors, the basins of attraction for which are delineated by the unstable ﬁxed
point kb. Part (b) is also non-ergodic. It shows the same low level attractor,
but now no high level attractor exists. Beginning at a state above kb leads to
unbounded growth. In part (c) the low level attractor is at zero.
29 In Romer (1986), for example, private investment generates new knowledge, some
of which enters the public domain and can be used by other ﬁrms. In Azariadis and
Drazen (1990) there are spillovers from human capital formation. See also Durlauf
(1993) and Zilibotti (1995). See Matsuyama (1997) and references for discussion of
how investment may feed back via pecuniary externalities into specialization and
hence productivity. Our discussion of microfoundations begins in Section 5.
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Fig. 7. Models with poverty traps
The ﬁgure in part (d) looks like an anomaly. Since the dynamics are formally
ergodic, many researchers will not view this structure as a “poverty trap”
model. Below we argue that this reading is too hasty: the model in (d) can
certainly generate the kind of persistent-poverty aggregate income data we are
hoping to explain.
In order to gain a more sophisticated understanding, let us now look at the
stochastic dynamics of the capital stock. Deterministic dynamics are of course
a special case of stochastic dynamics (with zero-variance shocks) but as in the
case of the neoclassical model above, let us suppose that (ξt)t≥0 is indepen-
dently and identically lognormally distributed, with lnξ ∼ N(µ,σ) and σ > 0.
It then follows that the sequence of marginal distributions (ψt)t≥0 for the cap-
ital stock sequence (kt)t≥0 again obeys the recursion (4) where the stochastic
kernel Γ is now
Γ(k,k
0) := ϕ
"
k0 − (1 − δ)k
sA(k)kα
#
1
sA(k)kα, (10)
26with ϕ the lognormal density on (0,∞) and zero elsewhere. All of the intuition
for the recursion (4) and the construction of the stochastic kernel (10) is
exactly the same as the neoclassical case.
How do the marginal distributions of the nonconvex growth model evolve?
The following result gives the answer for most cases we are interested in.
Proposition 3.1 Let (ξt)t≥0 be an independent sequence with lnξt ∼ N(µ,σ)
for all t. If the function k 7→ A(k) satisﬁes the regularity condition
0 < inf
k
A(k) ≤ sup
k
A(k) < ∞,
then the stochastic nonconvex growth model deﬁned by (9) is ergodic. 30
Ergodicity here refers to Deﬁnition 3.1 on page 18, which, incidentally, is
the standard deﬁnition used in growth theory and macroeconomics (see, for
example, Brock and Mirman 1972; or Stokey, Lucas and Prescott 1989). In
other words, there is a unique ergodic distribution ψ∗, and the sequence of
marginal distributions (ψt)t≥0 converges to ψ∗ asymptotically, independent of
the initial condition (assuming of course that k0 > 0). A proof of this result
is given in the technical appendix.
So why has a non-ergodic model become ergodic with the introduction of
noise? The intuition is completely straightforward: Under our assumption of
unbounded shocks there is always the potential—however small—to escape
any basin of attraction. So in the long run initial conditions do not matter.
(What does matter is how long this long run is, a point we will return to
below.)
Figure 8 gives the ergodic distributions corresponding to two poverty trap
models. 31 Both have the same structural dynamics as the model in part (a) of
Figure 7. The left hand panels show this structure with the shock suppressed.
The right hand panels show corresponding ergodic distributions under the
independent lognormal shock process. Both ergodic distributions are bimodal,
with modes concentrated around the deterministic local attractors.
Comparing the two left hand panels, notice that although qualitatively similar,
30 In fact we require also that k 7→ A(k) is a Borel measurable function. But this
condition is very weak indeed. For example, k 7→ A(k) need be neither monotone
nor continuous.
31 Regarding numerical computation see the discussion for the neoclassical case
above.
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Fig. 8. Ergodic distributions under increasing returns
the laws of motion for Country A and Country B have diﬀerent degrees of
increasing returns. For Country B, the jump occurring around k = 4 is larger.
As a result, the state is less likely to return to the neighborhood of the lower
attractor once it makes the transition out of the poverty trap. Therefore the
mode of the ergodic distribution corresponding to the higher attractor is large
relative to that of Country A. Economies driven by law of motion B spend
more time being rich.
Convergence to the ergodic distribution in a nonconvex growth model is il-
lustrated in Figure 9. The underlying model is (a) of Figure 7. 32 As before,
the ergodic distribution is bimodal. In this simulation, the initial distribution
was chosen arbitrarily. Note how initial diﬀerences tend to be magniﬁed over
the medium term despite ergodicity. The initially rich diverge to the higher
32 The speciﬁcation of A(k) used in the simulation is A(k) = aexp(hΨ(k)),
where a = 15, h = 0.52 and the transition function Ψ is given by Ψ(k) :=
(1+exp(−ln(k/kT)/θ))−1. The parameter kT is a “threshold” value of k, and is set
at 6.9. The parameter θ is the smoothness of the transition, and is set at 0.09. The
other parameters are α = 0.3, s = 0.2, δ = 1, and lnξ ∼ N(0,0.1).
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mode, creating the kind of “convergence club” eﬀect seen in ψ15, the period
15 marginal distribution. 33
It is clear, therefore, that ergodicity is not the whole story. If the support of
the shock ξ is bounded then ergodicity may not hold. Moreover, even with
ergodicity, historical conditions may be arbitrarily persistent. Just how long
they persist depends mainly on (i) the size of the basins of attraction and (ii)
the statistical properties of the shock. On the other hand, the non-zero degree
of mixing across the state space that drives ergodicity is usually more realistic
than deterministic models where poverty traps are absolute and can never
be overcome. Indeed, we will see that ergodicity is very useful for framing
empirical questions in Section 4.2.
Figures 10 and 11 illustrate how historical conditions persist for individual
time series generated by a model in the form of (a) of Figure 7, regardless
of ergodicity. In both ﬁgures, the x-axis is time and the y-axis is (the log of)
capital stock per worker. The dashed line through the middle of the ﬁgure
corresponds to (the log of) kb, the point dividing the two basins of attrac-
tion in (a) of Figure 7. Both ﬁgures show the simulated time series of four
33 Incidentally, the change in the distributions from ψ0 to ψ15 is qualitatively quite
similar to the change in the cross-country income distribution that has been observed
in the post war period.
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economies. In each ﬁgure, all four economies are identical, apart from their
initial conditions. One economy is started in the basin of attraction for the
higher attractor, and three are started in that of the lower attractor. 34
In the ﬁgures, the economies spend most of the time clustered in the neighbor-
hoods of the two deterministic attractors. Economies starting in the portion
of the state space (the y-axis) above the threshold are attracted on average to
the high level attractor, while those starting below are attracted on average
to the low level attractor. For these parameters, historical conditions are im-
portant in determining outcomes over the kinds of time scales economists are
interested in, even though there are no multiple equilibria, and in the limit
outcomes depend only on fundamentals.
In Figure 10, all three initially poor economies eventually make the transi-
tion out of the poverty trap, and converge to the neighborhood of the high
attractor. Such transitions might be referred to as “growth miracles.” In these
34 The speciﬁcation of A(k) is as in Figure 9, where now kT = 4.1, θ = 0.2, h = 0.95,
α = 0.3, s = 0.2, δ = 1. For Figure 10 we used lnξ ∼ N(0,0.1), while for Figure 11
we used lnξ ∼ N(0,0.05) .
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Fig. 11. Time series of 4 countries, low variance
series there are no “growth disasters” (transitions from high to low). The rel-
ative likelihood of growth miracles and growth disasters obviously depends on
the structure of the model—in particular, on the relative size of the basins of
attraction.
In Figure 10 the shock is distributed according to lnξ ∼ N(0,0.1), while in
Figure 11 the variance is smaller: lnξ ∼ N(0,0.05). Notice that in Figure 11
no growth miracles occur over this time period. The intuition is clear: With
less noise, the probability of a large positive shock—large enough to move
into the basin of attraction for the high attractor—is reduced, and with it the
probability of escaping from the poverty trap.
We now return to the model in part (d) of Figure 7, which is nonconvex,
but at the same time is ergodic even in the deterministic case. This kind of
structure is usually not regarded as a poverty trap model. In fact, since (d)
is just a small perturbation of model (a), the existence of poverty traps is
often thought to be very sensitive to parameters—a small change can cause
a bifurcation of the dynamics whereby the poverty trap disappears. But, in
fact, the phenomenon of persistence is more subtle. In terms of their medium
run implications for cross-country income patterns, the two models (a) and
310 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0
.
0
0
.
2
0
.
4
0
.
6
0
.
8
capital per effective worker
y0
y5
Fig. 12. Convergence under increasing returns
(d) are very similar.
To illustrate this, Figure 12 shows an arbitrary initial distribution and the
resulting time 5 distribution for k under the law of motion given in (d) of Fig-
ure 7. 35 As in all cases we have considered, the stochastic model is ergodic.
Now the ergodic distribution (not shown) is unimodal, clustered around the
single high level attractor of the deterministic model. Thus the long run dy-
namics are diﬀerent to those in Figure 9. However, during the transition,
statistical behavior is qualitatively the same as that for models that do have
low level attractors (such as (a) of Figure 7). In ψ5 we observe ampliﬁcation
of initial diﬀerences, and the formation of a bimodal distribution with two
“convergence clubs.”
How long is the medium run, when the transition is in progress and the distri-
bution is bimodal? In fact one can make this transition arbitrarily long without
changing the basic qualitative features of (d), such as the non-existence of a
low level attractor. Its length depends on the degree of nonconvexity and the
variance of the productivity shocks (ξt)t≥0. Higher variance in the shocks will
tend to speed up the transition.
35 The speciﬁcation of A(k) is as before, where now kT = 3.1, θ = 0.15, h = 0.7,
α = 0.3, s = 0.2, δ = 1, and lnξ ∼ N(0,0.2).
32The last two examples have illustrated an important general principle: In
economies with nonconvexities, the dynamics of key variables such as income
can be highly sensitive to the statistical properties of the exogenous shocks
which perturb activity in each period. 36 This phenomenon is consistent with
the cross-country income panel. Indeed, several studies have emphasized the
major role that shocks play in determining the time path of economic devel-
opment (c.f., e.g., Easterly, Kremer, Pritchett and Summers 1993; den Haan
1995; Acemoglu and Zilibotti 1997; Easterly and Levine 2000). 37
At the risk of some redundancy, let us end our discussion of the increasing
returns model (9) by reiterating that persistence of historical conditions and
formal ergodicity may easily coincide. (Recall that the time series in Figure 11
are generated by an ergodic model, and that (d) of Figure 7 is ergodic even
in the deterministic case.) As a result, identifying history dependence with a
lack of ergodicity can be problematic. In this survey we use a more general
deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 3.2 (Poverty trap) A poverty trap is any self-reinforcing mech-
anism which causes poverty to persist.
When considering a given quantitative model and its dynamic implications,
the important question to address is, how persistent are the self-reinforcing
mechanisms which serve to lock in poverty over the time scales that matter
when welfare is computed? 38
A ﬁnal point regarding this deﬁnition is that the mechanisms which reinforce
poverty may occur at any scale of social and spatial aggregation, from indi-
viduals to families, communities, regions, and countries. Traps can arise not
just across geographical location such as national boundaries, but also within
dispersed collections of individuals aﬃliated by ethnicity, religious beliefs or
clan. Group outcomes are then summed up progressively from the level of the
individual. 39
36 Such sensitivity is common to all dynamic systems where feedbacks can be posi-
tive. The classic example is evolutionary selection.
37 This point also illustrates a problem with standard empirical growth studies. In
general no information on the shock distribution is incorporated into calculation of
dynamics.
38 Mookherjee and Ray (2001) have emphasized the same point. See their discussion
of “self-reinforcement as slow convergence.”
39 This point has been emphasized by Barrett and Swallow (2003) in their discussion
of “fractal” poverty traps.
333.4 Poverty traps: inertial self-reinforcement
Next we turn to our second “canonical” poverty trap model, which again is
presented in a very simplistic form. (For microfoundations see Sections 5–8.)
The model is static rather than dynamic, and exhibits what Mookherjee and
Ray (2001) have described as inertial self-reinforcement. 40 Multiple equilibria
exist, and selection of a particular equilibrium can be determined purely by
beliefs or subjective expectations.
In the economy a unit mass of agents choose to work either in a traditional,
rural sector or a modern sector. Labor is the only input to production, and
each agent supplies one unit in every period. All markets are competitive. In
the traditional sector returns to scale are constant, and output per worker is
normalized to zero. The modern sector, however, is knowledge-intensive, and
aggregate output exhibits increasing returns due perhaps to spillovers from
agglomeration, or from matching and network eﬀects.
Let the fraction of agents working in the modern sector be denoted by α. The
map α 7→ f(α) gives output per worker in the modern sector as a function of
the fraction employed there. Payoﬀs are just wages, which equal output per
worker (marginal product). Agents maximize individual payoﬀs taking the
share α as exogenously given.
We are particularly interested in the case of strategic complementarities. Here,
entry into the modern sector exhibits complementarities if the payoﬀ to en-
tering the modern sector increases with the number of other agents already
there; in other words, if f is increasing. We assume that f0 > 0, and also that
returns in the modern sector dominate those in the traditional sector only
when the number of agents in the modern sector rises above some threshold.
That is, f(0) < 0 < f(1). This situation is shown in Figure 13. At the point
αb returns in the two sectors are equal.
Equilibrium distributions of agents are values of α such that f(α) = 0, as well
as “all workers are in the traditional sector,” or “all workers are in the modern
sector” (ignoring adjustments on null sets). The last two of these are clearly
Pareto-ranked: The equilibrium α = 0 has the interpretation of a poverty trap.
Immediately the following objection arises. Although the lower equilibrium is
to be called a poverty trap, is there really a self-reinforcing mechanism here
40 By “static” we mean that there are no explicitly speciﬁed interactions between
separate periods.
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which causes poverty to persist? After all, it seems that as soon as agents
coordinate on the good equilibrium “poverty” will disappear. And there are
plenty of occasions where societies acting collectively have put in place the
institutions and preconditions for successful coordination when it is proﬁtable
to do so.
Although the last statement is true, it seems that history still has a role to
play in equilibrium selection. This argument has been discussed at some length
in the literature, usually beginning with myopic Marshallian dynamics, under
which factors of production move over time towards activities where returns
are higher. In the case of our model, these dynamics are given by the arrows
in Figure 13. If (α0)t≥0 is the sequence of modern sector shares, and if initially
α0 < αb, then αt → 0. Conversely, if α0 > αb, then αt → 1.
But, as many authors have noted, this analysis only pushes the question one
step back. Why should the sectoral shares only evolve slowly? And if they can
adjust instantaneously, then why should they depend on the initial condition at
all? What are the sources of inertia here that prevent agents from immediately
35coordinating on good equilibria? 41
Adsera and Ray (1997) have proposed one answer. Historical conditions may
be decisive if—as seems quite plausible—spillovers in the modern sector arise
only with a lag. A simpliﬁed version of the argument is as follows. Suppose that
the private return to working in the modern sector is rt, where now r0 = f(α0)
and rt takes the lagged value f(αt−1) when t ≥ 1. Suppose also that at the end
of each period agents can move costlessly between sectors. Agent j chooses
location in order to maximize a discounted sum of payoﬀs given subjective
beliefs (α
j
t)t≥0 for the time path of shares, where to be consistent we require
that α
j
0 = α0 for all j.
Clearly, if α0 < αb, then switching to or remaining in the traditional sector
at the end of time zero is a dominant strategy regardless of beliefs, because
r1 = f(α0) < f(αb) = 0. The collective result of these individual decisions is
that α1 = 0. But then α1 < αb, and the whole process repeats. Thus αt = 0 for
all t ≥ 1. This outcome is interesting, because even the most optimistic set of
beliefs lead to the low equilibrium when f(α0) < 0. To the extent that Adsera
and Ray’s analysis is correct, history must always determine outcomes. 42
Another way that history can re-enter the equation is if we admit some de-
viation from perfect rationality and perfect information. As was stressed in
the introduction, this takes us back to the role of institutions, through which
history is transmitted to the present.
It is reasonable to entertain such deviations here for a number of reasons. First
and foremost, assumptions of complete information and perfect rationality are
usually justiﬁed on the basis of experience. Rationality obtains by repeated
observation, and by the punishment of deviant behavior through the carrot
and stick of economic payoﬀ. Rational expectations are justiﬁed by appeal-
ing to induction. Agents are assumed to have had many observations from a
stationary environment. Laws of motion and hence conditional expectations
are inferred on the basis of repeated transition sampling from every relevant
state/action pair (Lucas 1986). When attempting to break free from a poverty
trap, however, agents have most likely never observed a transition to the high
level equilibrium. On the basis of what experience are they to assess its like-
41 See, for example, Krugman (1991) or Matsuyama (1991).
42 There are a number of possible criticisms of the result, most of which are discussed
in detail by the authors. If, for example, there are congestion costs or ﬁrst mover
advantages, then moving immediately to the modern sector might be rational for
some optimistic beliefs and speciﬁcation of parameters.
36lihood from each state and action? How will they assess the diﬀerent costs or
beneﬁts?
In a boundedly rational environment with limited information, outcomes will
be driven by norms, institutions and conventions. It is likely that these factors
are among the most important in terms of a society’s potential for successful
coordination on good equilibria. In fact for some models we discuss below
the equilibrium choice is not between traditional technology and the modern
sector, but rather is a choice between predation (corruption) and production,
or between maintaining kinship bonds and breaking them. In some sense these
choices are inseparable from the social norms and institutions of the societies
within which they are framed. 43
The central role of institutions may not prevent rapid, successful coordination
on good equilibria. After all, institutions and conventions are precisely how
societies solve coordination problems. As was emphasized in the introduction,
however, norms, institutions and conventions are path dependent by deﬁnition.
And, in the words of Matsuyama (1995, p. 724), “coordinating expectations
is much easier than coordinating changes in expectations.” Because of this,
economies that start out in bad equilibria may ﬁnd it diﬃcult to break free.
Why should a convention that locks an economy into a bad equilibrium de-
velop in the ﬁrst place? Perhaps this is just the role of historical accident.
Or perhaps, as Sugden (1989) claims, conventions tend to spread on the basis
of versatility or analogy. 44 If so, the conventions that propagate themselves
most successfully may be those which are most versatile or susceptible to
analogy—not necessarily those which lead to “good” or eﬃcient equilibria.
Often the debate on historical conditions and coordination is cast as “his-
tory versus expectations.” We have emphasized the role of history, channeled
through social norms and institutions, but without intending to say that be-
liefs are not important. Rather, beliefs are no doubt crucial. At the same time,
43 More traditional candidates for coordinating roles among the set of institutions
include interventionist states promoting industrialization through policy-based ﬁ-
nancing, or (the cultural component of) large business groups, such as Japan’s
keiretsu and South Korea’s chaebol. In Section 5.2, we discuss the potential for
large banks with signiﬁcant market power to drive “big push” type investments by
the private sector.
44 A versatile convention works reasonably well against many strategies, and hence
is advantageous when facing great uncertainty. Analogy means that a rule for a
particular situation is suggested by similar rules applied to diﬀerent but related
situations.
37beliefs and expectations are shaped by history. And they in turn combine with
value systems and local experience to shape norms and institutions. The latter
then determine how successful diﬀerent societies are in solving the particular
coordination problems posed by interactions in free markets.
If beliefs and expectations are shaped by history, then the “history versus
expectations” dichotomy is misleading. The argument that beliefs and expec-
tations are indeed formed by a whole variety of historical experiences has been
made by many development theorists. In an experiment investigating the ef-
fects of the Indian caste system, Hoﬀ and Pandey (2004) present evidence
that individuals view the world through their own lens of “historically created
social identities,” which in turn has a pronounced eﬀect on expectations. Ros-
tow (1990, p. 5) writes that “the value system of [traditional] societies was
generally geared to what might be called a long run fatalism; that is, the as-
sumption that the range of possibilities open to one’s grandchildren would be
just about what it had been for one’s grandparents.” Ray (2003, p. 1) argues
that “poverty and the failure of aspirations may be reciprocally linked in a
self-sustaining trap.”
Finally, experimental evidence on coordination games with multiple Pareto-
ranked equilibria suggests that history is important: Outcomes are strongly
path dependent. For example, Van Huyck, Cook and Battalio (1997) study
people’s adaptive behavior in a generic game of this type, where multiple
equilibria are generated by strategic complementarities. In each experiment,
eight subjects participated in a sequence of between 15 and 40 plays. The
authors ﬁnd sensitivity to initial conditions, deﬁned here as the median of
the ﬁrst round play. In their view, “the experiment provides some striking
examples of coordination failure growing from small historical accidents.”
4 Empirics of Poverty Traps
Casual observation of the cross-country income panel tends to be suggestive
of mechanisms which reinforce wealth or poverty. In Section 4.1 we review the
main facts. Section 4.2 considers tests for the empirical relevance of poverty
trap models. While the results of the tests support the hypothesis that the
map from fundamentals to economic outcomes is not unique, it gives no in-
dication as to what forces might be driving multiplicity. Section 4.3 begins
the diﬃcult task of addressing this issue in a macroeconomic framework. Fi-
nally, Section 4.4 gives references to empirical tests of speciﬁc microeconomic
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mechanisms that can reinforce poverty at the individual or group level.
4.1 Bimodality and convergence clubs
A picture of the evolving cross-country income distribution is presented in
Figure 14. For both the top and bottom histograms the y-axis measures fre-
quency. For the top pair (1960 and 1995) the x-axis is GDP per capita in 1996
PPP adjusted dollars. This is the standard histogram of the cross-country
income distribution. For the bottom pair the x-axis represents income as a
fraction of the world average for that year.
The single most striking feature of the absolute income histograms for 1960
and 1995 is that over this period a substantial fraction of poor countries have
grown very little or not at all. At the same time, a number of middle income
countries have grown rapidly, in some cases fast enough to close in on the
rich. Together, these forces have caused the distribution to become somewhat
39thinner in the middle, with probability mass collecting at the extremes. Such
an outcome is consistent with mechanisms that accentuate diﬀerences in initial
conditions, and reinforce wealth or poverty. Related empirical studies include
Azariadis and Drazen (1990), Quah (1993, 1996), Durlauf and Johnson (1995),
Bianchi (1997), Pritchett (1997), Desdoigts (1999) and Easterly and Levine
(2000).
As well as observing past and present distributions, Quah (1993) also used the
Penn World Tables to estimate a transition probability matrix by discretizing
the state space (income per capita), treating all countries as observations
from the same Markovian probability law, and measuring transition frequency.
This matrix provides information on mobility. Also, by studying the ergodic
distribution, and by multiplying iterations of the matrix with the current
cross-country income distribution, some degree of inference can be made as to
where the income distribution is heading.
In his calculation, Quah uses per capita GDP relative to the world average
over the period 1962 to 1984 in a sample of 118 countries. Relative income
is discretized into state space S := {1,2,3,4,5} consisting of 5 “bins,” with
states corresponding to values for relative GDP of 0–0.25, 0.25–0.5, 0.5–1,
1–2 and 2–∞ respectively. The transition matrix P = (pij) is computed by
setting pij equal to the fraction of times that a country, ﬁnding itself in state
i, makes the transition to state j the next year. The model is assumed to be
stationary, so all of the transitions can be pooled when calculating transition
probabilities. The result of this calculation (Quah 1993, p. 431) is
P =


 
 
 
 
 

0.97 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.05 0.92 0.03 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.04 0.92 0.04 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.04 0.94 0.02
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.99


 
 
 
 
 

.
The Markov chain represented by P is easily shown to be ergodic, in the
sense that there is a unique ψ∗ ∈ P(S), the distributions on S, with the
property that ψ∗P = ψ∗, and ψPt → ψ∗ as t → ∞ for all ψ ∈ P(S). 45
Quah calculates this ergodic distribution ψ∗ to be (0.24,0.18,0.16,0.16,0.27).
45 Following Markov chain convention we are treating the distributions in P(S)
as row vectors. Also, Pt is t compositions of P with itself. For more discussion of
ergodicity see the technical appendix, or Stachurski (2004).
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Fig. 15. Discrete projection
The ergodic distribution is quite striking, in that the world is divided almost
symmetrically into two convergence clubs of rich and poor at either end of the
income distribution.
It is not immediately clear just how long the long run is. To get some in-
dication, we can apply Pt to the current distribution for diﬀerent values of
t. Figure 15 shows the results of applying P30 to the year 2000 income dis-
tribution from the Penn World Tables. This gives a projection for the 2030
distribution. Contrasted with the 1960 distribution the prediction is strongly
bimodal.
As Quah himself was at pains to emphasize, the projections carried out above
are only a ﬁrst pass at income distribution dynamics, with many obvious
problems. One of those is that the dynamics generated by a discretized version
of a continuous state Markov chain can deviate very signiﬁcantly from the
true dynamics generated by the original chain, and error bounds are diﬃcult
to quantify. 46 Also, since the estimation of P is purely nonparametric, the
projections do not contain any of the restrictions implied by growth theory.
46 Compare, for example, Feyrer (2003) and Johnson (2004).
41Quah (1996) addressed the ﬁrst of these problems by estimating a continuous
state version. In the language of this survey, he estimates a stochastic kernel
Γ, of which P is a discretized representation. The estimation is nonparamet-
ric, using a Parzen-window type density smoothing technique. The kernel is
suggestive of considerable persistence.
Azariadis and Stachurski (2004) make some eﬀort to address both the dis-
cretization problem and the lack of economic theory simultaneously, by esti-
mating Γ parametrically, using a theoretical growth model. In essence, they
estimate equation (9), where k 7→ A(k) is represented by a three-parameter
logistic function. The logistic function nests a range of growth models, from
the convex model in Figure 2 to the nonconvex models in Figure 7, panels (a),
(b) and (d). Once the law of motion (9) is estimated, the stochastic kernel Γ is
calculated via equation (10), and the projection of distributions is computed
by iterating (4).
The resulting 2030 prediction is shown in Figure 16, with the 1960 distribution
drawn above for comparison. The x-axis is log of real GDP per capita in
1996 US dollars. The 1960 density is just a smoothed density estimate using
Gaussian kernels, with data from the Penn World Tables. The same data was
used to estimate the parameters in the law of motion (9). As in Figure 15, a
unimodal distribution gives way to a bimodal distribution.
These ﬁndings do lend some support to Quah’s convergence club hypothesis.
Much work remains to be done. For example, in all of the methodologies
discussed above, nonstationary data is being ﬁtted to a stationary Markov
chain. This is clearly a source of bias. Furthermore, all of these models are
too small, in the sense that the state space used in the predictions are only
one-dimensional. 47
47 In fact within each economy there are many interacting endogenous variables, only
one of which is income. Even if the process as a whole is stationary and Markov,
projection of the system onto one dimension will yield a process which is not gen-
erally Markovian. Moreover, there are interactions between countries that aﬀect
economic performance, and these interactions are important. A ﬁrst-best approach
would be to treat the world economy as an N × M-dimensional Markov process,
where N is the number of countries, and M is the number of endogenous variables
in each country. One would then estimate the stochastic kernel Γ for this process,
a map from RN×M
+ × RN×M
+ → [0,∞). Implications for the cross-country income
distribution could be calculated by computing marginals.
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4.2 Testing for existence
Poverty trap models tend to be lacking in testable quantitative implications.
Where there are multiple equilibria and sensitive dependence to initial con-
ditions, outcomes are much harder to pin down than when the map from
parameters to outcomes is robust and unique. This has led many economists
to question the empirical signiﬁcance of poverty trap models. 48 In this section,
we ask whether or not there is any evidence that poverty traps exist.
In answering this question, one must be very careful to avoid the following
circular logic: First, persistent poverty is observed. Poverty traps are then
oﬀered as the explanation. But how do we know there are poverty traps?
Because (can’t you see?) poverty persists. 49 This simple point needs to be
kept in mind when interpreting the data with a view to assessing the empirical
relevance of the models in this survey. Persistent poverty, emergent bimodality
and the dispersion of cross-country income are the phenomena we seek to
explain. They cannot themselves be used as proof that poverty traps explain
48 See Matsuyama (1997) for more discussion of this point.
49 This is a version of Karl Popper’s famous tale about Neptune and the sea.
43the data.
Also, a generalized convex neoclassical model can certainly be the source of
bimodality and dispersion if we accept that the large diﬀerences in total factor
productivity residuals across countries are due to some exogenous force, the
precise nature of which is still waiting to be explained. In this competing
explanation, the map from fundamentals to outcomes is unique, and shocks
or historical accidents which perturb the endogenous variables can safely be
ignored.
The central question, then, is whether or not the poverty trap explanation
of cross-country income diﬀerentials survives if we control for the exogenous
forces which determine long run economic performance. In other words, do self-
reinforcing and path dependent mechanisms imply that economies populated
by fundamentally similar people in fundamentally similar environments can
support very diﬀerent long run outcomes? What empirical support is there for
such a hypothesis?
One particularly interesting study which addresses this question is that of
Bloom, Canning and Sevilla (2003). Their test is worth discussing in some
detail. To begin, consider again the two multiple equilibria models shown in
Figure 8 (page 28), along with their ergodic distributions. As can be seen in the
left hand panels, when the shock is suppressed both Country A and Country
B have two locally stable equilibria for capital per worker—and therefore two
locally stable equilibria for income. Call these two states y∗
1 and y∗
2, the ﬁrst
of which is interpreted as the poverty trap.
In general, y∗
1 and y∗
2 will depend on the vector of exogenous fundamentals,
which determine the exact functional relationships in the model, and hence
become parameters in the law of motion. Let this vector be denoted by x.
Consider a snapshot of the economy at some point in time t. We can write
income per capita as
y =



y∗
1(x) + u1 with probability p(x);
y∗
2(x) + u2 with probability 1 − p(x).
(R2)
Here p(x) is the probability that the country in question is in the basin of
attraction for the lower equilibrium y∗
1(x) at time t. This probability is deter-
mined by the time t marginal distribution of income. The shock ui represents
deviation from the deterministic attractor at time t.
Figure 8 (page 28) helps to illustrate how y∗
1 and y∗
2 might depend on the
44exogenous variables. Imagine that Countries A and B have characteristics xA
and xB respectively. These diﬀerent characteristics account for the diﬀerent
shapes of the laws of motion shown in the left hand side of the ﬁgure. As
drawn, y∗
2(xA), the high level attractor for Country A, is less than y∗
2(xB), the
high level attractor for Country B, while y∗
1(xA) and y∗
1(xB) are roughly equal.
In addition, we can see how the probability p(x) of being in the poverty
trap basin depends on these characteristics. For time t suﬃciently large, er-
godicity means that the time t marginal distribution—which determines this
probability—can be identiﬁed with the ergodic distribution. The ergodic dis-
tribution in turn depends on the underlying structure, which depends on x.
This is illustrated by the diﬀerent sizes of the distribution modes for Countries
A and B in Figure 8. For Country A the left hand mode is relatively large,
and hence so is p(x).
Using a maximum likelihood ratio test, the speciﬁcation (R2) is evaluated
against a single regime alternative
y = y
∗(x) + u, (R1)
which can be thought of for the moment as being generated by a convex Solow
model. The great beneﬁt of the speciﬁcation (R1) and (R2)—as emphasized
by the authors—is that long run output depends only on exogenous factors.
The need to specify the precise system of endogenous variables and their
interactions is circumvented. 50
In conducting the test of (R1) against (R2), it is important not to include
as exogenous characteristics any variable which is in fact endogenously deter-
mined. For to do so might result in conditioning on the outcomes of the under-
lying process which generates multiple equilibria. In the words of the authors,
“Including such variables may give the impression of a unique equilibrium re-
lationship [for the economic system] when in reality they are a function of the
equilibrium being observed. Fundamental forces must be characteristics that
determine a country’s economic performance but are not determined by it.”
In the estimation of Bloom, Canning and Sevilla, only geographic features
are included in the set of exogenous variables. These include data on distance
from equator, rainfall, temperature, and percentage of land area more than
100km from the sea. For this set of variables, the likelihood ratio test rejects
the single regime model (R1) in favor of the multiple equilibria model (R2).
50 Ergodicity is critical in this respect, for without it p will depend not just on x
but also on the lagged values of endogenous variables.
45They ﬁnd evidence for a high level equilibrium which does not vary with
x, and a low level equilibrium which does. In particular, y∗
1(x) tends to be
smaller for hot, dry, land-locked countries (and larger for those with more
favorable geographical features). In addition, p(x) is larger for countries with
unfavorable geographical features. In other words, the mode of the ergodic
distribution around y∗
1(x) is relatively large. For these economies escape from
the poverty trap is more diﬃcult.
Overall, the results of the study support the poverty trap hypothesis. They also
serve to illustrate the importance of distinguishing between variables which
are exogenous and those which have feedback from the system. If one condi-
tions on “explanatory” variables which deviate signiﬁcantly from fundamental
forces, the likelihood of observing multiple equilibria in the map from those
variables to outcomes will be lower. For example, one theme of this survey
is that institutions can be an important source of multiplicity, either directly
or indirectly through their interactions with the market. If institutions are
endogenous, and if traps in institutions drive the disparities in cross-country
incomes, then conditioning on institutions may give spurious convergence re-
sults entirely disconnected from long run outcomes generated by the system.
4.3 Model calibration
One of the advantages of the methodology proposed by Bloom, Canning and
Sevilla is that estimation and testing can proceed without fully specifying the
underlying model. The exacting task of determining the relevant set of endoge-
nous variables and the laws by which they interact is thereby circumvented.
But there are two sides to this coin. While the results of the test suggest that
poverty traps matter, they give no indication as to their source, or to the
appropriate framework for formulating them as models.
Graham and Temple (2004) take the opposite approach. They give the results
of a numerical experiment starting from a speciﬁc poverty trap model, some-
what akin to the inertial self-reinforcement model of Section 3.4. The question
they ask is whether or not the model in question has the potential to explain
observed cross-country variation in per capita income for a reasonable set of
parameters. We brieﬂy outline their main ﬁndings, as well as their technique
for calibration, which is of independent interest.
As in Section 3.4, there is both a traditional agricultural sector and a mod-
ern sector with increasing social returns due to technical externalities. The
46agricultural sector has a decreasing returns technology
Ya = AaL
γ
a, γ ∈ (0,1), (11)
where Ya is output, Aa is a productivity parameter and La is labor employed
in the agricultural sector. The j-th ﬁrm in the modern sector has technology
Ym,j = AmLm,jL
λ
m, λ > 0, (12)
where Ym,j is output of ﬁrm j, Am is productivity, Lm,j is labor employed by
ﬁrm j, and Lm is total employment in the modern sector. The ﬁrm ignores
the eﬀect of its hiring decisions on Lm, thus setting the stage for multiplicity.
We set La + Lm = L, a ﬁxed constant, and, as usual, α := Lm/L.
The relative price of the two goods is ﬁxed in world markets and normalized
to one by appropriate choice of units. Wages are determined by marginal cost
pricing: wa = γAaLγ−1
a and wm = AmLλ
m. Setting these factor payments equal
gives the set of equilibrium modern sector shares α as solutions to the equation
(1 − α)
1−γα
λ =
AaγLγ−1−λ
Am
. (13)
Regarding calibration, γ is a factor share, and the increasing returns parameter
λ has been calculated in several econometric studies. 51 Relative productivity
is potentially more problematic. However, it turns out that (13) has precisely
two solutions for reasonable parametric values. Since both solutions α1 and
α2 satisfy (13) we have
(1 − α1)
1−γα
λ
1 − (1 − α2)
1−γα
λ
2 = 0. (14)
In which case, assuming that current observations are in equilibrium, one can
take the observed share as α1, calculate α2 as the other solution to (14), and
set the poverty trap equilibrium equal to α∗
1 := min{α1,α2}. The high produc-
tivity equilibrium is α∗
2 := max{α1,α2}. Figure 17 illustrates this procedure
for α1 = 0.1, γ = 0.7 and λ = 0.3.
When α∗
1, α∗
2, γ and λ are known, a little algebra shows that the ratio of output
in the high equilibrium to output in the low equilibrium can also be computed.
In this way it is possible to evaluate the relative impact of the poverty trap
on individual countries and the cross-country income distribution.
Using this strategy and a more elaborate model (including both capital and
land), Graham and Temple’s main ﬁndings are as follows. First, for reasonable
51 See, for example, Cabarello and Lyons (1992).
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parameter values some 1/4 of the 127 countries in their 1988 data set are in
the poverty trap α∗
1. Second, after calculating the variance of log income across
countries when all are in their high output equilibrium and comparing it to
the actual variance of log income, they ﬁnd that the poverty trap model can
account for some 2/5 to one half of all observed variation in incomes.
Overall, their study suggests that the model can explain some properties of
the data, such as the diﬀerence between poor, agrarian economies and low to
middle income countries. On the other hand, it cannot account for the huge
diﬀerences between the very poorest and the rich industrialized countries. In
the model, the largest ratios of low to high equilibrium production are in the
region of two to three. As we saw in Section 2.1, however, actual per capita
output ratios between rich and poor countries are much larger.
4.4 Microeconomic data
There has also been research in recent years on poverty traps that occur at
the individual or group level. For example, Jalan and Ravallion (2002) ﬁt a
microeconomic model of consumption growth with localized spillovers from
capital to farm-household panel data in rural China. Their results are consis-
tent with empirical signiﬁcance of geographical poverty traps. Other authors
48have studied particular trap mechanisms. For example, Bandiera and Rasul
(2003) and Conley and Udry (2003) consider the eﬀects of positive network
externalities on technology adoption in Mozambique and Ghana respectively.
Barrett, Bezuneh and Aboud (2001) consider the dynamic impact of credit
constraints on the poor in Cˆ ote d’Ivoire and Kenya. Morduch (1990) studies
the eﬀect of risk on income in India, as does Dercon (1998) for Tanzania.
5 Nonconvexities, Complementarities and Imperfect Competition
Increasing returns production under imperfect competition is a natural frame-
work to think about multiple equilibria. Imperfect competition leads directly
to externalities transmitted through the price system, because monopolists
themselves, rather than Walrasian auctioneers, set prices, and presumably
they do so with their own proﬁt in mind. At the same time, their pricing
and production decisions impinge on other agents. These general equilibrium
eﬀects can be a source of multiplicity.
Section 5.1 illustrates this idea using the big push model of Murphy, Shleifer
and Vishny (1989); a model which formalizes an earlier discussion in Rosenstein-
Rodan (1943). Rosenstein-Rodan argued that modern industrial technology is
freely available to poor countries, but has not been adopted because the do-
mestic market is too small to justify the ﬁxed costs it requires. If all sectors
industrialize simultaneously, however, the market may potentially be expanded
to the extent that investment in modern technology is proﬁtable.
Thus the big push model of Section 5.1 helps to clarify the potential challenges
posed by coordination for the industrialization process. We shall see that the
major coordination problem facing monopolists cannot be resolved by the
given market structure. In this situation, the ability of a society to successfully
coordinate entrepreneurial activity—and thereby realize the social beneﬁts
available in modern production technologies—will depend in general on such
structures as its institutions, political organizations, the legal framework, and
social and business conventions.
In countries such as South Korea, the state has been very active in attempting
to overcome coordination problems associated with industrialization. In West-
ern Europe, the state was typically much less active, and the role of the private
sector was correspondingly larger. For example, Da Rin and Hellmann (2002)
have recently emphasized the important role played by banks in coordinating
industrialization. Section 5.2 reviews their model.
49A theme of this survey is traps that prevent economies as a whole from adopt-
ing modern production technologies. One aspect of this transformation to
modernity is the need for human capital. If investment in human capital has
a high economic payoﬀ then a skilled work-force should spontaneously arise.
Put diﬀerently, if the poor are found to invest little in schooling or training
then this suggests to us that returns to these investments are relatively low.
Section 5.3 reviews Kremer’s (1993) matching model, where low investment
in schooling sustains itself in a self-reinforcing trap.
Finally, Section 5.4 gives references to notable omissions on the topic of in-
creasing returns.
5.1 Increasing returns and imperfect competition
Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny’s (1989) formalization of Rosenstein-Rodan’s
(1943) big push is something of a watershed in development economics. Their
model turns on demand spillovers which create complementarities to invest-
ment. They point out that for the economy to generate multiple equilibria,
it must be the case that investment simultaneously (i) increases the size of
other ﬁrms’ markets, or otherwise improves the proﬁtability of investment;
and (ii) has negative net present value. This means that proﬁts alone cannot
be the direct source of the market size eﬀects; otherwise (i) and (ii) would be
contradictory.
In the ﬁrst model they present, higher wages in the modern sector are the
channel through which demand spillovers increase market size. Although in-
vestment is not individually proﬁtable, it raises labor income, which in turn
raises the demand for other products. If the spillovers are large enough, mul-
tiple equilibria will occur. In their second model, investment in the modern
technology changes the composition of aggregate demand across time. In the
ﬁrst period, the single monopolistic ﬁrm in each sector decides whether to
invest or not. Doing so incurs a ﬁxed cost F in the ﬁrst period, and yields
output ωL in the second, where ω > 1 is a parameter and L is labor input.
The cost in the second period is just L, as wages are the numeraire. If, on the
other hand, the monopolist chooses not to invest, production in that sector
will take place in a “competitive fringe” of atomistic ﬁrms using constant re-
turns to scale technology. For these ﬁrms, one unit of labor input yields one
unit of output. The price for each unit so produced is unity.
All wages and proﬁts accrue to a representative consumer, who supplies L
50units of labor in both periods, and maximizes the undiscounted utility of his
consumption, that is,
max
Z 1
0
lnc1(α)dα +
Z 1
0
lnc2(α)dα

  ct: [0,1] 3 α 7→ ct(α) ∈ [0,∞)

subject to the constraints
R 1
0 c1p1 ≤ y1 and
R 1
0 p2c2 ≤ y2. Here α ∈ [0,1]
indexes the sector, ct(α) and pt(α) are consumption and price of good α at
time t respectively, and yt is income (wages plus proﬁts) at time t. 52
In the ﬁrst period only the competitive fringe produces, and p1(α) = 1 for all α.
In the second, monopolists face unit elastic demand curves c2(α) = y2/p2(α).
Given these curves and the constraints imposed by the competitive fringe,
monopolists set p2(α) = 1 for all α. Their proﬁts are π = ay2 − F, where
a := 1 − 1/ω is the mark-up.
Consider proﬁtability when all entrepreneurs corresponding to sectors [0,α]
decide to invest. (The number α can also be thought of as the fraction of the
total number of monopolists who invest.) It turns out that for some parameter
values both α = 0 and α = 1 are equilibria. To see this, consider ﬁrst the case
α = 0, so that y1 = y2 = L. It is not proﬁtable for a ﬁrm acting alone to
invest if π = aL − F ≤ 0. On the other hand, if α = 1, then y1 = L − F and
y2 = ωL, so monopolists make positive proﬁts when aωL − F ≥ 0. Multiple
equilibria exist if these inequalities hold simultaneously. In Figure 18 multiple
equilibria obtain for all L ∈ [L1,L2].
As was mentioned in the introduction, coordination problems and other mech-
anisms that reinforce the status quo can interact with each other and magnify
their individual impact. Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) provide a simple
example of this in the context of the model outlined above. They point out
that the coordination problem for the monopolists is compounded if industri-
alization requires widespread development of infrastructure and intermediate
inputs, such as railways, road networks, port facilities and electricity grids. All
of these projects will themselves need to be coordinated with industrialization.
For example, suppose that n infrastructure projects must be undertaken in the
ﬁrst period to permit industrialization in the second. Each project has a ﬁxed
52 To simplify the exposition we assume that consumers can neither save nor dissave
from current income. For the moment we also abstract from the existence of a
ﬁnancial sector. Firms which invest simply pay all wages in the second period at
a zero rate of interest. See the original for a more explicitly general equilibrium
formulation.
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cost Rn, and operates in the second period at zero marginal cost. Leaving
aside the issue of how the spoils of industrialization will be divided among
the owners of the projects and the continuum of monopolists, it is clear that
industrialization has the potential to be proﬁtable for all only when aωL−F,
the proﬁts of the monopolists when α = 1, exceed total infrastructure costs
Pn
i=1 Ri.
If the condition aL−F ≤ 0 continues to hold, however, individual monopolists
investing alone will be certain to lose money. Realizing this, investors in infras-
tructure face extrinsic uncertainty as to whether or not industrialization will
actually take place. Given their subjective evaluation, they may choose not
to start their infrastructure projects. In turn, the monopolists are aware that
investors in infrastructure face uncertainty, and may themselves refrain from
starting projects. This makes monopolists even more uncertain as to whether
or not the conditions for successful industrialization will eventuate. The ﬁxed
point of this inﬁnite regression of beliefs may well be inaction. In either case,
the addition of more actors adds to the diﬃculty of achieving coordination.
525.2 The ﬁnancial sector and coordination
As Da Rin and Hellmann (2002) have recently emphasized, one candidate
within the private sector for successfully coordinating a big push type indus-
trialization is the banks. Banks are the source of entrepreneurs’ funds, and
shape the terms and conditions under which capital may be raised. In ad-
dition, banks interact directly with many entrepreneurs. Finally, banks can
potentially proﬁt from coordinating industrialization if their market power is
large.
Da Rin and Hellmann ﬁnd that the structure and legal framework of the bank-
ing sector are important determinants of its ability to coordinate successful
industrialization. To illustrate their ideas, consider again the big push model
of Section 5.1. In order to make matters a little easier, let us simply deﬁne
the second period return of monopolists (entrepreneurs) to be f(α), where α
is the fraction of entrepreneurs who decide to set up ﬁrms and the function
f : [0,1] → R is strictly increasing. As before, there is a ﬁxed cost F to be
paid in the ﬁrst period, which we set equal to 1. The future is not discounted.
It is convenient to think of the number of entrepreneurs as some large but ﬁnite
number N. 53 In addition to these N entrepreneurs, there is now a ﬁnancial
sector, members of whom are referred to as either “banks” or “investors.”
There are B ∈ N banks, the ﬁrst B − 1 of which have an intermediation cost
of r per unit of investment. The last bank has an intermediation cost of zero,
but can lend to only ` ≤ N ﬁrms. The number ` can be thought of as a
measure of the last bank’s market power.
The equilibrium lending rate at which ﬁrms borrow in the ﬁrst period is deter-
mined by the interaction of the monopolists and the banks. In the ﬁrst stage
of the game, each bank b oﬀers a schedule of interest rates to the N ﬁrms.
This strategy will be written as σb := {ib
n : 1 ≤ n ≤ N}. The collection of
these strategies across banks will be written as σ := {σb : 1 ≤ b ≤ B}. Let Σ
be the set of all such σ.
In the second stage, each entrepreneur either rejects all oﬀers and does not set
up the ﬁrm, or selects the minimum interest rate, pays the ﬁxed cost and enters
the market. In what follows we write mn(σ) to mean minb ib
n, the minimum
interest rate oﬀered to ﬁrm n in σ. If a fraction α accepts contracts then ﬁrm
53 In particular, entrepreneurs do not take into account their inﬂuence on α when
evaluating whether to set up ﬁrms or not.
53n makes proﬁts
π(α,mn(σ)) = f(α) − (1 + mn(σ)). (15)
For bank b < B, proﬁts are given by
Πb(σb) =
N X
n=1
(i
b
n − r)1{ﬁrm n accepts}, (16)
where here and elsewhere 1{Q} is equal to one when the statement Q is true
and zero otherwise. For b = B, proﬁts are
Πb(σb) =
N X
n=1
i
b
n1{ﬁrm n accepts}. (17)
In equilibrium, banks never oﬀer interest rates strictly greater than r, because
should they do so other banks will always undercut them. As a result, we can
and do assume in all of what follows that mn(σ) ≤ r for all n. Also, to make
matters interesting, we assume that f(0) < 1 + r < f(1), or, equivalently,
π(0,r) < 0 < π(1,r). (18)
Firms’ actions will depend on their beliefs—in particular, on what fraction α
of the N ﬁrms they believe will enter. Clearly beliefs will be contingent on the
set of contracts oﬀered by banks. Thus a belief for ﬁrm n is a map αe
n from Σ
into [0,1]. Given this belief, ﬁrm n enters if and only if
π(α
e
n(σ),mn(σ)) ≥ 0. (19)
Given σ, the set of self-supporting equilibria for the second stage subgame is
Ω(σ) :=
(
α ∈ [0,1] :
1
N
N X
n=1
1{π(α,mn(σ)) ≥ 0} = α
)
. (20)
In other words, α ∈ Ω(σ) if, given the set of oﬀers σ and the belief on the part
of all ﬁrms that the fraction of ﬁrms entering will be α, exactly α × 100% of
ﬁrms ﬁnd it optimal to enter.
Beliefs are required to be consistent in the sense that αe
n(σ) ∈ Ω(σ) for all σ
and all n. Beliefs are called optimistic if αe
n = αopt for all n, where αopt(σ) :=
maxΩ(σ) for all σ ∈ Σ. In other words, all agents believe that as many ﬁrms
will enter as are consistent with oﬀer σ, and this is true for every σ ∈ Σ. Beliefs
are deﬁned to be pessimistic if the opposite is true; that is, if αe
n = αpes for all
n, where αpes(σ) := minΩ(σ) for all σ ∈ Σ.
54Da Rin and Hellmann ﬁrst observe that if ` = 0, then the outcome of the
game will be determined by beliefs. In particular, if beliefs are pessimistic,
then the low equilibrium α = 0 will obtain. If beliefs are optimistic, then the
high equilibrium α = 1 will obtain. The interpretation is that when ` = 0, so
that the market for ﬁnancial services is entirely competitive (in the sense of
Bertrand competition with identical unit costs described above), the existence
of the ﬁnancial sector will not alter the primary role of beliefs in determining
whether industrialization will take place.
Let us verify this observation in the case of pessimistic beliefs. To do so, it is
suﬃcient to show that if σ ∈ Σ is optimal, then 0 ∈ Ω(σ). The reason is that
if 0 ∈ Ω(σ), then by (20) we have π(0,mn(σ)) < 0 for all n. Also, beliefs are
pessimistic, so αe
n(σ) = minΩ(σ) = 0. In this case no ﬁrms enter by (19).
To see that 0 ∈ Ω(σ) for all optimal σ, suppose to the contrary that σ ∈ Σ is
optimal, but 0 / ∈ Ω(σ). Then π(0,mk(σ)) ≥ 0 for some k, in which case (18)
implies that mk(σ) < r. Because ﬁrms only accept contracts at rates less than
r (that is, mn(σ) ≤ r for all n), it follows from (16) that the bank which lent
to k looses money, and σ is not optimal. The intuition is that no bank has
market power, and cannot recoup losses sustained when encouraging ﬁrms to
enter by oﬀering low interest rates.
More interesting is the case where the last bank B has market power. With
suﬃcient market power, B will induce industrialization (the high equilibrium
where α = 1) even when beliefs are pessimistic:
Proposition 5.1 (Da Rin and Hellmann) Suppose beliefs are pessimistic.
In this case, there exists an ¯ α ∈ [0,1] depending on r and f such that indus-
trialization will occur whenever `, the market power of B, satisﬁes `/N ≥ ¯ α.
The result shows that rather than relying on spontaneous coordination of
beliefs, ﬁnancial intermediaries may instead be the source of coordination.
The key intuition is that a ﬁnancial intermediary may have a proﬁt motive for
inducing industrialization. But to achieve this, two things are necessary: size
and market power. Size (as captured by `) is necessary to induce a critical mass
of entrepreneurs to invest. Market power (as captured by the cost advantage
r) is necessary to recoup the costs of mobilizing that critical mass. We sketch
Da Rin and Hellmann’s proof in the appendix.
Until now we have considered only the possibility that the banks oﬀer pure
debt contracts. Da Rin and Hellmann also study the case where the banks
may hold equity as well (i.e., universal banking). They show that in this case
55the threshold level at which the lead bank B has suﬃcient market power to
mobilize the critical mass is lower. Industrialization is unambiguously more
likely to occur. The reason is that equity permits B to partake in the ex post
proﬁts of the critical mass, who beneﬁt from low interest rates on one hand
and complete entry (α = 1) on the other. With a lower cost of mobilizing
ﬁrms, B requires less market power to recoup these losses. In Da Rin and
Hellmann’s words,
Our model provides a rationale for why a bank may want to hold equity
that has nothing to do with the standard reasons of providing incentives for
monitoring. Instead, equity allows a bank to participate in the gains that it
creates when inducing a higher equilibrium.
In summary, the theory suggests that large universal banks with a high degree
of market power can play a central role in the process of industrialization.
This theory is consistent with the evidence from countries such as Belgium,
Germany and Italy, where a few oligopolist banks with strong market positions
played a pivotal role. Some were pioneers of universal banking, and many
directly coordinated activity across sectors by participation in management.
The theory may also explain why other countries, such as Russia, failed to
achieve signiﬁcant industrialization in the 19th Century. There banks were
small and dispersed, their market power severely restricted by the state.
5.3 Matching
The next model we consider is due to Kremer (1993), and has the following
features. A production process consists of n distinct tasks, organized within
a ﬁrm. For our purposes n can be regarded as exogenous. The tasks are un-
dertaken by n diﬀerent workers, all of whom have their own given skill level
hi ∈ [0,1]. Here the skill level will be thought of as the probability that the
worker performs his or her task successfully. We imagine that if one worker
fails in their task the entire process is ruined and output is zero. If all are
successful, the outcome of the process is n units of the product. 54 That is,
y = n
n Y
i=1
1{worker i successful}, P{worker i successful} = hi, (21)
54 Assuming one unit might seem more natural than n, but the latter turns out to
be more convenient.
56where as before 1{Q} = 1 if the statement Q is true and zero otherwise. All
of the success probabilities are independent, so that E(y) = n
Q
i hi.
Consider an economy with a unit mass of workers. The distribution of skills
across workers is endogenous, and will be discussed at length below. Kremer’s
ﬁrst point is that in equilibrium, ﬁrms will match workers of equal skill together
to perform the process. The intuition is that (i) ﬁrms will not wish to pair a
work-force of otherwise skilled employees with one relatively unskilled worker,
who may ruin the whole process; and (ii) ﬁrms with a skilled work-force will be
able to bid more for skilled workers, because the marginal value of increasing
the last worker’s skill is increasing in the skill of the other workers. Thus, for
each ﬁrm,
E(y) = nh
n, h the ﬁrm’s common level of worker skill. (22)
The ﬁrst thing to notice about this technology is that the expected marginal
return to skill is increasing. As a result, small diﬀerences in skill can have rela-
tively large eﬀects on output. This may go some way to explaining the extraor-
dinarily large wage diﬀerentials between countries. Moreover, for economies
with such technology, positive feedback dynamics of the kind considered in
Section 3.3 may result, even if the technology for creating human capital is
concave.
Another channel for positive feedbacks occurs when matching is imperfect,
perhaps because it is costly or the population is ﬁnite. Exact matches may not
be possible. In that case, there are potentially returns to agglomeration: Skilled
people clustering together will decrease the cost of matching, and increase the
likelihood of good matches. Also, an initial distribution of skills will tend to
persist, because workers will choose skills so as to be where the distribution
is thickest. This maximizes their chances of ﬁnding good matches. But this is
self-reinforcing: Their choices perpetuate the current shape of the distribution.
There is yet another channel that Kremer suggests may lead to multiple equi-
librium distributions of skill. This is the situation where skill levels are imper-
fectly observed. We present a simple (and rather extremist) version of Kremer’s
model. In the ﬁrst period, workers decide whether to undertake “schooling”
or not. This education involves a common cost c ∈ (0,1). In the second, ﬁrms
match workers, produce, and pay out wages. Both goods and labor markets
are competitive, and total wages exhaust revenue. Speciﬁcally, it is assumed
that each worker’s wage w is 1/n-th of ﬁrm’s output.
Not all of those who undertake schooling become skilled. We assume that the
57educated receive a skill level h = 1 with probability p > 1/2 and h = 0 with
probability 1 − p. Those who do not undertake schooling have the skill level
h = 0. Further, h is not observable, even for workers. Instead, all workers take
a test, which indicates their true skill with probability p and the reverse with
probability 1 − p. 55 That is,
t := test score =



h with probability p;
1 − h with probability 1 − p.
(23)
Firms then match workers according to the test score t rather than h.
Let α ∈ [0,1] denote the fraction of workers who choose to undertake schooling.
We will show that for certain values of the parameters p and c, both α = 0
and α = 1 are equilibria. In doing so, we assume that p is known to all. Also,
workers and ﬁrms are risk neutral.
Consider ﬁrst the case where α = 0. If the worker undertakes schooling, then,
regardless of his skill and test score, his expected wage is 1/n-th of n
Q
i hi,
where his co-workers are drawn from a pool in which the skilled workers have
measure zero. That is, P{hi = 0} = 1. It follows that expected output and
wage are zero. Since c > 0, it is optimal to avoid schooling. 56
Now consider the agent’s problem when α = 1. In the second period, the agent
will be matched with other workers having the same test score. In either case,
computing expected wages is a signal extraction problem. First, using the fact
that agents in the pool of potential co-workers have chosen schooling with
probability one, the agent can calculate probable skills of a co-worker chosen
at random from the population, given their test score:
P{h = 1|t = 1} =
P{h = 1 and t = 1}
P{t = 1}
=
p2
p2 + (1 − p)2 =: θp, (24)
and,
P{h = 1|t = 0} =
P{h = 1 and t = 0}
P{t = 0}
=
p(1 − p)
p(1 − p) + p(1 − p)
=
1
2
. (25)
The worker can use these probabilities to compute expected output and hence
wages given the diﬀerent outcomes of his own test score. In particular, E(w|t =
55 We are using the same p as before just to simplify notation.
56 On the other hand, if skills are perfectly observable, workers who acquire skills
will be matched with n workers from the measure zero set of agents having h = 1.
In that case w = 1. Since c < 1 it is optimal to choose schooling, and α = 0 is not
an equilibrium. The same logic works for any α < 1
581) = θn
p and E(w|t = 0) = (1/2)n. It follows that the expected return to
schooling for the agent is
E(w|schooling) = E(w|t = 0)P{t = 0} + E(w|t = 1)P{t = 1}
=
1
2n(1 − p) + θ
n
pp.
Conversely, E(w|no schooling) = 1
2np + θn
p(1 − p). Schooling is optimal if
c < E(w|schooling) − E(w|no schooling)
= (2p − 1)(θ
n
p − (1/2)
n) := c
∗(p).
It is easy to see that c∗(p) > 0 whenever p > 1/2, which is true by assumption.
As a result, schooling will be optimal for some suﬃciently small c, and α = 1
is an equilibrium too. 57
What are the sources of multiple equilibria in the model? The ﬁrst is pecuniary
externalities in the labor market: When more agents become educated, the
probability that the marginal worker can successful match with a skilled co-
worker increases. In turn, this increases the returns to education. 58 Second,
there is imperfect information: Skilled workers cannot readily match with other
skilled workers. Instead, matching is probabilistic, and depends on the overall
distribution of skills. Finally, the increasing expected marginal reward for skill
inherent in the production function means that the wage spillovers from the
decisions of other agents are potentially large.
Another important model of human capital investment with multiple equi-
libria is Acemoglu (1997). He shows how labor market frictions can induce a
situation where technology adoption is restricted by a lack of appropriately
skilled workers. Low adoption in turn reduces the expected return to training,
further exacerbating the scarcity of workers who are trained. In other words,
poor technology adoption and low capital investment are self-reinforcing, be-
cause they cause the very shortage of skilled workers necessary to make such
investments proﬁtable.
57 It may seem that if p = 1 and observation is perfect, then E(w|schooling) −
E(w|no schooling) should be zero, so that no multiple equilibria are possible. But
under this assumption the above derivation of c∗(p) is not valid, because we would
be conditioning on sets with probability zero.
58 In fact the expected wage is increased for all, but those who become skilled beneﬁt
more.
595.4 Other studies of increasing returns
Young’s (1928) famous paper on increasing returns notes that not only does
the degree of specialization depend on the size of the market, but the size of the
market also depends on the degree of specialization. In other words, there are
eﬃciency gains from greater division of labor, primarily due to application of
machines. Greater specialization increases productivity, which then expands
the market, leading back into more specialization, and so on. As a result,
there are complementarities in investment. These complementarities can be
the source of poverty traps. A detailed discussion of this process is omitted
from the present survey, but only because excellent surveys already exist.
See in particular Matsuyama (1995) and Matsuyama (1997). Other references
include Matsuyama and Ciccone (1996), Rodr´ ıguez-Clare (1996) and Rodrik
(1996).
Increasing returns are also associated with geographical agglomeration. Star-
rett (1978) points out that agglomerations cannot form as the equilibria of
perfectly competitive economies set in a homogeneous space. Thus all ag-
glomerations must be caused either by exogenous geographical features or by
some market imperfection. An obvious candidate is increasing returns. (It is
diﬃcult to see what geographical features could explain the extent of concen-
tration witnessed in places such as Tokyo or Hong Kong.) This survey does
not treat geography and its possible connections with poverty traps in much
detail. Interested readers might start with the review of Ottaviano and Thisse
(2004). 59
Another source of complementarities partly related to geography is positive
network externalities in technology adoption. These are often thought to arise
from social learning: Local experience with a technology allows the cost of
adoption to decrease as the number of adopters in some network gets larger.
As well as information spillovers, more adopters of a given technology may
lead to the growth of local supply networks for intermediate inputs, repairs
and servicing, skilled labor and so on. See, for example, Beath, Katsoulacos
and Ulph (1995), Bandiera and Rasul (2003), Conley and Udry (2003), and
Baker (2004).
Finally, an area that we have not treated substantially in this survey is opti-
mal growth under nonconvexities, as opposed to the ﬁxed savings rate model
59 See also Limao and Venables (2001) or Redding and Venables (2004) for the
empirics of geography and international income variation.
60considered in Section 3.3. In other words, how do economies evolve when (i)
agents choose investment optimally by dynamic programming, given a set of
intertemporal preferences; and (ii) the aggregate production function is non-
convex?
There are two main cases. One is that increasing returns are taken to be ex-
ternal, perhaps as a feedback from aggregate capital stock to the productivity
residual, and agents perceive the aggregate production function to be convex.
In this case there is a subtle issue: In order to optimize, agents must have
a belief about how the productivity residual evolves. This may or may not
coincide with its actual evolution as a result of their choices. An equilibrium
transition rule is a speciﬁcation of savings and investment behavior such that
(a) agents choose this rule given their beliefs; and (b) those choices cause ag-
gregate outcomes to meet their expectations. Existence of such an equilibrium
is far from assured. See Mirman, Morand and Reﬀett (2004) and references
therein. Dynamics are still actively being investigated.
The second case is where increasing returns are internal, and agents perceive
aggregate production possibilities exactly as they are. These models generate
similar poverty traps as were found for ﬁxed savings rates in Section 3.3. The
literature is large. An early investigation is Skiba (1978). See also Dechert and
Nishimura (1983), who consider a per capita production function k 7→ f(k)
which is convex over a lower region of the state space (capital per worker),
and concave over the remainder; and Amir, Mirman and Perkins (1991), who
study the same problem using lattice programming. Majumdar, Mitra and
Nyarko (1989) study optimal growth for stochastic nonconvex models, as do
Nishimura and Stachurski (2004). Dimaria and Le Van (2002) analyze the
dynamics of deterministic models with R&D and corruption. 60
6 Credit Markets, Insurance and Risk
In terms of informational requirements necessary for eﬃcient free market op-
eration and low transaction costs, one of the most problematic of all markets is
the intertemporal trade in funds. Here information is usual asymmetric, and
lenders face the risk of both voluntary and involuntary default (Kehoe and
Levine 1993). Voluntary default is strategic default by borrowers who judge
60 One should be cautious about interpreting these nonconvex models as aggregative
studies of development. The Second Fundamental Welfare Theorem does not apply,
so decentralization is problematic.
61the expected rewards of repayment to be lower than those of not repaying the
loan. Involuntary default occurs when ex post returns are insuﬃcient to cover
total loans.
Facing these risks, a standard response of lenders is to make use of collateral
(Kiyotaki and Moore 1997). But the poor lack collateral almost by deﬁnition;
as a result they are credit constrained. Credit constraints in turn restrict
participation by the poor in activities with substantial set up costs, as well as
those needing large amounts of working capital. For the poor, then, the range
of feasible income-generating activities is reduced. Thus, the vicious circle of
poverty: Income determines wealth and low wealth restricts collateral. This
trap is discussed in Section 6.1. 61
The market for insurance is similar to the market for credit, in that information
is asymmetric and transaction costs are high. This can lead to poverty traps
in several ways. In Section 6.2, we study a model where poor agents, lacking
access to insurance or credit, choose low risk strategies at the cost of low mean
income. These choices reinforce their poverty.
In Section 6.3 we review Matsuyama’s (2004) world economy model, where all
countries must compete for funds in a global ﬁnancial market. On one hand,
diminishing returns imply that rewards to investment in the poor countries are
large. High returns attract funds and investment, and high investment provides
a force for convergence. On the other hand, credit markets are imperfect, and
rich countries have more collateral. This puts them in a strong position vis-a-
vis the poor when competing for capital. The inability of the poor to guarantee
returns with collateral is a force for divergence.
6.1 Credit markets and human capital
Consider an economy producing only one good and facing a risk free world
interest rate of zero. Agents live for one period. Each has one and only one
child. From their parent, the child receives a bequest x. At the beginning of
life, each agent chooses between two occupations. The ﬁrst is to work using
a constant returns technology Y = ¯ wL, where Y is output, L is total labor
input in this sector, and w is a productivity parameter. The agent supplies all
61 See also Tsiddon (1992) for a poverty trap model connected to the market for
credit. In his model, asymmetric information leads to a moral hazard problem,
which restricts the ability of investors to raise money. The market solution involves
quantity constraints on loans, the severity of which depends on the level of income.
62of his or her labor endowment `t, and we deﬁne wt := ¯ w`t as the return to this
choice of occupation. We admit the possibility that `t varies stochastically, so
wt may be random.
Alternatively, the agent may set up a project at cost F. The gross payoﬀ from
the project is equal to Qt. Agents with wealth xt < F may borrow to cover
the costs of the project beyond which they are able to self-ﬁnance. They face
interest rate i > 0, where the excess of the borrowing rate over the risk free
rate reﬂects a credit market imperfection. In this case we have in mind costs
imposed on lenders due to the need for supervision and contract enforcement
(c.f., e.g., Galor and Zeira 1993, p. 39). These costs are then passed on to the
borrower.
The two stochastic productivity parameters wt and Qt are draws from joint
distribution ϕ. We assume that E`t = 1, and that Ewt = ¯ w < EQt −F. Thus,
the net return to setting up the project is higher on average than the wage.
However, the agent may still choose to work at wage rate wt if his or her
income is relatively low. The reason is that for the poor setting up a project
requires ﬁnance at the borrowing rate i > 0, which may oﬀset the diﬀerential
return between the two occupations.
Consider the employment decisions and wealth dynamics for each dynasty.
Omitting time subscripts, an agent with bequest x has
y := lifetime income =

   
   
x + w if do not set up project;
(x − F)(1 + i) + Q if set up project, x < F;
(x − F) + Q if set up project, x ≥ F.
Preferences are given by u(c,b) = (1 − θ)lnc + θlnb, where θ ∈ (0,1) is a
parameter, c is consumption and b is bequest to the child. As a result, each
agent bequeaths a fraction θ of y; the remainder is consumed. Indirect utility
is v(y) = γ + δ lny, where γ,δ > 0 are constants.
To abstract temporarily from the issue of risk aversion let us suppose that each
agent can observe his or her idiosyncratic shocks (wt,Qt) prior to choosing
a ﬁeld of employment. As a result, agents with x ≥ F will choose to set
up projects iﬀ Q − F ≥ w. Agents with x < F will choose the same iﬀ
(x − F)(1 + i) + Q ≥ x + w; in other words, iﬀ
x ≥ ˆ x :=
w − Q + F(1 + i)
i
.
It follows that dynamics for each dynasty’s wealth in this economy are given
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by the transition rule
xt+1 = St(xt); St(xt) = θ ×

   
   
xt + wt if xt ≤ ˆ xt;
(xt − F)(1 + i) + Qt if xt ∈ (ˆ xt,F);
xt − F + Qt if xt ≥ F.
Figure 19 illustrates a transition rule S and hence the dynamics of this econ-
omy when the two rates of return are constant and equal to their means. 62
For this particular parameterization there are multiple equilibria. Agents with
initial wealth less than the critical value xb will converge to the lower attrac-
tor, while those with greater wealth will converge to the high attractor. Given
any initial distribution ψ0 of wealth in the economy, the fraction of agents con-
verging to the lower attractor will be
R xb
0 ψ0. If this fraction is large, average
long run income in the economy will be small.
A more realistic picture can be obtained if the productivity parameters are
permitted to vary stochastically around their means. This will allow at least
some degree of income mobility—perhaps very small—which we tend to ob-
serve over time in almost all societies. To this end, suppose that for each agent
62 The parameters here are set to θ = 0.7, w = 0.06, Qt ≡ 1.05, i = 2 and F = 0.65.
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Fig. 20. Stochastic law of motion
and at each point in time the parameters wt and Qt are drawn independently
across time and agents from a bivariate lognormal distribution. In this case
the transition law is itself random, and varies for each agent at each point in
time.
Figure 20 shows a simulated sequence of transition rules facing a given agent
starting at t = 1. At t = 2 a negative shock to the project return Q causes
the high level attractor to disappear. A series of such negative shocks would
cause a rich dynasty to loose its wealth. In this case, however, the shocks are
iid and such an outcome is unlikely. It turns out that the time 3 shocks are
strongly positive.
If the number of agents is large, then the sequence of cross-sectional distri-
butions for wealth over time can be identiﬁed with the sequence of marginal
probability laws (ψt)t≥0 generated by the Markov process xt+1 = St(xt). It is
not diﬃcult to prove that this Markov process is ergodic. The intuition and
the dynamics are more or less the same as for the nonconvex growth model of
Section 3.3. 63 We postpone further details on dynamics until the next section,
63 As we discussed at length in that section, it would be a mistake to claim that this
65which treats another version of the same model.
There are several interpretations of the two sector story with ﬁxed costs de-
scribed above. One is to take the notion of a project or business literally, in
which case F is the cost of set up and working capital which must be paid
up before the return is received. Alternatively F might be the cost of school-
ing, and Q is the payoﬀ to working for skilled individuals. 64 As emphasized
by Loury (1981) and others, human capital is particularly problematic for
collateral-backed ﬁnancing, because assets produced by investment in human
capital cannot easily be bonded over to cover the risk of default.
Whatever the precise interpretation, the “project” represents an opportunity
for the poor to lift themselves out of poverty, while the ﬁxed cost F and the
credit market imperfection captured here by i constitute a barrier to tak-
ing it. Microeconometric studies suggests that the eﬀects of this phenomenon
are substantial. For example, Barrett, Bezuneh and Aboud (2001) analyze
the eﬀects of a large devaluation of the local currency that occurred in Cˆ ote
d’Ivoire in 1994 on rural households. They ﬁnd that “A macro policy shock
like an exchange rate devaluation seems to create real income opportunities
in the rural sector. But the chronically poor are structurally impeded from
seizing these opportunities due to poor endowments and liquidity constraints
that restrict their capacity to overcome the bad starting hand they have been
dealt.” (Barrett et al. 2001, p. 12)
The same authors also study a local policy shock associated with food aid dis-
tribution in Keyna. According to this study, “The wealthy are able to access
higher-return niches in the non-farm sector, increasing their wealth and rein-
forcing their superior access to strategies oﬀering better returns. Those with
weaker endowments ex ante are, by contrast, unable to surmount liquidity
barriers to entry into or expansion of skilled non-farm activities and so remain
ergodicity result in some way overturns the poverty trap found in the deterministic
version.
64 For these and related stories see Ray (1990), Ray and Streufert (1993), Baner-
jee and Newman (1993), Galor and Zeira (1993), Ljungqvist (1993), Freeman
(1996), Quah (1996), Aghion and Bolton (1997), Piketty (1997), Matsuyama (2000)
Mookherjee and Ray (2003) and Banerjee (2003). Yet another possible interpreta-
tion of the model is that F is the cost of moving from a rural to an urban area
in order to ﬁnd work. In the presence of imperfect capital markets, such costs—
interpreted broadly to include any extra payments incurred when switching to the
urban sector—may help to explain the large and growing diﬀerentials between urban
and rural incomes in some modernizing countries.
66trapped in lower return...livelihood strategies.” (Barrett et al. 2001, p. 15).
6.2 Risk
For the poor another possible source of historical self-reinforcement is risk. In
the absence of well-functioning insurance and credit markets, the poor ﬁnd
ways to mitigate adverse shocks and to smooth out their consumption. One
way to limit exposure is to pass up opportunities which might seem on balance
proﬁtable but are thought to be too risky. Another strategy is to diversify
activities; and yet another is to keep relatively large amounts of assets in
easily disposable form, rather than investing in ventures where mean return is
high. All of these responses of the poor to risk have in common the fact that
they tend to lower mean income and reinforce long run poverty.
A simple variation of the model from the previous section illustrates these
ideas. 65 Let the framework of the problem be the same, but current shocks
are no longer assumed to be previsible. In other words, each agent must decide
his or her career path before observing the shocks wt and Qt which determine
individual returns in each sector. Given that preferences are risk averse (indi-
rect utility is v(y) = γ +δ lny), the agent makes these decisions as a function
not only of mean return but of the whole joint distribution. Regarding this
distribution, we assume that both shocks are lognormal and may be correlated.
Lenders also cannot observe these variables at the start of time t, and hence
the borrowing rate i = i(x) reﬂects the risk of default, which in turn depends
on the wealth x of the agent. In particular, default occurs when Qt is less than
the debtor’s total obligations (F − x)(1 + i(x)). In that case the debtor pays
back what he or she is able. Lifetime income is therefore
y =

   
   
x + w if do not set up project;
max{0,(x − F)(1 + i(x)) + Q} if set up project, x < F;
(x − F) + Q if set up project, x ≥ F.
It turns out that in our very simplistic environment agents will never borrow,
because when shocks are lognormal agents with x < F who borrow will have
P{y = 0} > 0, in which case Ev(y) = −∞. (If x ≥ F agents may still
choose to work for a wage, depending on the precise joint distribution.) The
result that agents never borrow is clearly unrealistic. For more sophisticated
65 What follows is loosely based on Banerjee (2003).
67versions of this model with similar dynamics see Banerjee (2003) or Checchi
and Garc´ ıa-Pe˜ nalosa’s (2004).
Because agents never borrow, the dynamics for the economy are just
xt+1 = θ(xt + wt) · 1{xt ∈ D} + θ(xt − F + Qt) · 1{xt / ∈ D},
where D := {x : Ev(x+wt) ≥ Ev(x−F +Qt)}. (As before, 1 is the indicator
function.) The stochastic kernel Γ for this process can be calculated separately
for the two cases x ∈ D and x / ∈ D using the same change-of-variable technique
employed in Section 3.1. The calculation gives
Γ(x,x
0) = ϕw
 
x0 − θx
θ
!
1
θ
· 1{x ∈ D} + ϕQ
 
x0 − θ(x − F)
θ
!
1
θ
· 1{x / ∈ D},
where ϕw and ϕQ are the marginal densities of w and Q respectively.
A two-dimensional plot of the kernel is given in Figure 21, where the param-
eters are F = 1, θ = 0.45, lnw ∼ N(0.1,1), and lnQ ∼ N(1.4,0.2). The
dark unbroken line is the 45o line. Lighter areas indicate greater elevation, in
this case associated with a collection of probability mass. For the parameters
chosen, agents work precisely when x < F, and set up projects when x ≥ F
(so that D = [0,F]), despite the fact that mean returns to the project are
higher than those of working. The concentration of probability mass along
the 45o line in the region D = [0,F] implies that poverty will be strongly
self-reinforcing.
Nevertheless, lognormal shocks give poor individuals a non-zero probability of
becoming rich at every transition; and the rich can eventually become poor,
although it might take a sequence of negative shocks. The rate of mixing
depends on the parameters that make up the law of motion and the variance
of the shock. Usually some small degree of mixing is a more natural assumption
than none. The mixing causes the corresponding Markov chain to be ergodic.
This is the case regardless of how small the tails of the shocks are made. 66
For more details on ergodicity see the technical appendix.
To summarize, the poor are not wealthy enough to self-insure, and as a result
choose income streams that minimize risk at the expense of mean earnings.
The eﬀect is to reinforce poverty. A number of country studies provide evidence
of this behavior. 67 Dercon (2003) ﬁnds that the eﬀects on mean income are
substantial. In a review of the theoretical and empirical literature, he estimates
66 But not necessarily so if the shocks have bounded support.
67 See, for example, Morduch (1990) and Dercon (1998).
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that incomes of the poor could be 25–50% higher on average if they had the
same protection against shocks that the rich had as a result of their wealth
(Dercon 2003, p. 14).
A more sophisticated model of the relationship between risk and development
is Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997). In their study, indivisibilities in technology
imply that diversiﬁcation possibilities are tied to income. An increase in invest-
ment raises output, which then improves the extent of diversiﬁcation. Since
agents are risk averse, greater diversiﬁcation encourages more investment. In
the decentralized outcome investment is too small, because agents do not take
into account the eﬀect of their investment on the diversiﬁcation opportunities
of others.
6.3 Credit constraints and endogenous inequality
Next we consider a world economy model with credit market imperfections
due to Matsuyama (2004). For an individual country, the formulation of the
problem is as follows. A unit mass of agents live for two periods each, supplying
69one unit of labor in the ﬁrst period of life and consuming all their wealth in the
second. Per capita output of the consumption good is given by yt = f(kt)ξt,
where f is a standard concave production function, kt is the capital stock and
(ξt)t≥0 is a noise process. Once the current shock ξt is realized production then
takes place. Factor markets are competitive, so that labor and capital receive
payments wt = [f(kt) − ktf0(kt)]ξt =: w(kt,ξt) and %t = f0(kt)ξt respectively.
Current wages wt are invested by young agents to ﬁnance consumption when
old. Funds can be invested in a competitive capital market at gross interest
rate Rt+1, or in a project which transforms one unit of the ﬁnal good into Q
units of the capital good at the start of next period. It is assumed that projects
are discrete and indivisible: Each agent can run one and only one project. 68
They will need to borrow 1 − wt, the excess cost of the project over wages.
Our agents are risk neutral. Time t information is summarized by the infor-
mation set Ft, and we normalize E[ξt+1 |Ft] = 1. In the absence of borrowing
constraints, agents choose to start a project if E[%t+1Q−Rt+1(1−wt)|Ft] ≥
E[Rt+1wt |Ft]. This is equivalent to
E[Rt+1 |Ft] ≤ E[%t+1Q|Ft]. (26)
However, it is assumed that borrowers can credibly commit to repay only a
fraction λ of revenue %t+1Q. Thus λ ∈ [0,1] parameterizes the degree of credit
market imperfection faced by borrowers in this economy. As a result, agents
can start a project only when E[λ%t+1Q|Ft] exceeds E[Rt+1(1−wt)|Ft], the
cost of funds beyond those which the agent can self-ﬁnance. In other words,
when wt = w(kt,ξt) < 1, we must have
E[Rt+1 |Ft] ≤ Λ(kt,ξt)E[%t+1Q|Ft], (27)
where Λ(kt,ξt) := λ/(1 − wt) Given the proﬁtability constraint (26), the bor-
rowing constraint (27) binds only when Λ(kt,ξt) < 1. 69
In the case of autarky it turns out that adjustment of the domestic interest
rate can always equilibrate domestic savings and domestic investment. Since
each generation of agents has unit mass, total domestic savings is just wt. If
wt ≥ 1, then all agents run projects and total output of the capital good is
68 Put diﬀerently, we imagine that output is Q units of capital good for all invest-
ment levels greater than or equal to one. See the original model for a more general
technology.
69 Of course if wt ≥ 1 then all agents can self-ﬁnance and the borrowing constraint
never binds.
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Q. If wt < 1, then wt is equal to the fraction of agents who can start projects.
Output of the capital good is wtQ. Assuming that capital depreciates totally
in each period, we get kt+1 = min{w(kt,ξt)Q,Q}. If, for example, technology
in the ﬁnal good sector is Cobb-Douglas, so that f(k) = Akα, where α < 1,
then w(kt,ξt) = (1−α)Akαξt. For ξt ≡ 1 there is a unique and globally stable
steady state k∗.
A more interesting case for us is the small open economy. Here a world interest
rate of R is treated as ﬁxed and given. The ﬁnal good is tradable, so interna-
tional borrowing and lending are allowed. However, the project must be run
in the home country (no foreign direct investment) and factors of production
are nontradable.
In the open economy setting there is a perfectly elastic supply of funds at the
world interest rate R. The eﬀective demand for funds on the part of domes-
tic projects is determined by (26) and (27). The right hand side of (26) is
the expected marginal product of capital in this sector, E[%t+1Q|Ft]. Since
E[ξt+1|Ft] = 1 we have E[%t+1Q|Ft] = f0(kt+1)Q. Absent borrowing con-
straints, investment adjusts to equalize f0(kt+1)Q with R. Figure 22 shows the
intersection of the curve k 7→ f0(k)Q with the horizontal supply curve R at
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Φ(R/Q), where Φ is the inverse function of f0.
As the ﬁgure is drawn, however, Λ(kt,ξt) < 1, perhaps because the capital
stock is small, or because of an adverse productivity shock. As a result, the
borrowing constraint is binding, and next period’s capital stock kt+1 is given
by the intersection of the eﬀective demand curve k 7→ Λ(kt,ξt)f0(k)Q and the
supply curve R.
Assuming that Φ(R/Q) < Q as drawn in the ﬁgure, the law of motion for the
capital stock is kt+1 = Ψ(kt,ξt), where
Ψ(k,ξ) :=



Φ[R/Λ(k,ξ)Q] if w(k,ξ) < 1 − λ;
Φ(R/Q) if w(k,ξ) ≥ 1 − λ.
(28)
For w(kt,ξt) < 1 − λ we have Λ(kt,ξt) < 1 and the borrowing constraint
binds. Domestic investment is insuﬃcient to attain the unconstrained equilib-
rium Φ(R/Q). In this region of the state space, the law of motion k 7→ Ψ(k,ξ)
is increasing in k. Behind this increase lies a credit multiplier eﬀect: Greater
domestic investment increases collateral, which alleviates the borrowing con-
straint. This in turn permits more domestic investment, which increases col-
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Fig. 24. Stochastic dynamics
lateral, and so on. Individual agents do not take into account the eﬀect of
their actions on the borrowing constraint.
Figure 23 shows the law of motion when ξt ≡ 1. As drawn, there is a poverty
trap at kL and another attractor at Φ(R/Q). Countries with kt > kU tend
to Φ(R/Q), while those with kt < kU tend to kL. Figure 24 shows stochastic
dynamics by superimposing the ﬁrst 50 laws of motion from a simulation on the
45o diagram. The shocks (ξt)t≥0 are independent and identically distributed. 70
Notice that for particularly good shocks the lower attractor kL disappears,
while for particularly bad shocks the higher attractor at Φ(R/Q) vanishes.
Figure 25 shows a simulated time series for the same parameters as Figure 24
over 400 periods. At around t = 290 the economy transitions to the higher
attractor Φ(R/Q). Subsequent ﬂuctuations away from this equilibrium are due
to shocks so negative that Φ(R/Q) ceases to be an attractor (see Figure 24).
The story does not end here. What is particularly interesting about Mat-
suyama’s study is his analysis of symmetry-breaking. He shows the following
70 The production function is f(k) = kα. The shock is lognormal. The parameters
are α = 0.59, Q = 2.4, λ = 0.40, R = 1 and lnξ ∼ N(0.01,0.08).
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for a large range of parameter values: For a world economy consisting of a
continuum of such countries, the deterministic steady state for autarky, which
is k∗ deﬁned by k∗ = w(k∗,1)Q, is precisely kU, the unstable steady state for
each country under open international ﬁnancial markets and a world inter-
est rate that has adjusted to equate world savings and investment. Figure 26
illustrates the situation.
Thus, the symmetric steady state after liberalization, where each country has
capital stock k∗, is unstable and cannot be maintained under any perturbation.
The reason is that countries which suﬀer from bad (resp., good) shocks are
weakened (resp., strengthened) in terms of their ability to guarantee returns
on loans, and therefore to compete in the world ﬁnancial market. This leads to
a downward (resp. upward) spiral. Under these dynamics the world economy
is polarized endogenously into rich and poor countries.
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7 Institutions and Organizations
The fundamental economic problem is scarcity. Since the beginning of life on
earth, all organisms have engaged in competition for limited resources. The
welfare outcomes of this competition have ranged from eﬃcient allocation to
war, genocide and extinction. It is the rules of the game which determine
the social welfare consequences. More precisely, it is the long run interaction
between the rules of the game and the agents who compete.
Institutions—which make up the rules of the game—were at one time thought
to have strong eﬃciency properties in equilibrium. To a large extent, this
is no longer the case (for an introduction to the literature, see, for example
North 1993, 1995; or Hoﬀ 2000). Institutions can either reinforce market failure
or themselves be the source of ineﬃciency. Moreover, institutions are path
dependent, so that bad equilibria forming from historical accident may be
locked in, causing poverty to persist.
Among the set of institutions, the state is one of the most important de-
terminants of economic performance; and one of the most common kinds of
75“government failure” is corruption. 71 In Section 7.1 we review why corrup-
tion is thought to be not only bad for growth and development, but also
self-reinforcing.
Section 7.2 then looks at the kinship system, a kind of institution that arises
spontaneously in many traditional societies to address such market problems
as lack of formal insurance. We consider how these systems may potentially
form a local poverty trap, by creating hurdles to adoption of new techniques
of production. Although the aggregate outcome is impoverishing, it is shown
that the kinship system may nevertheless fail to be dismantled as a result of
individual incentives.
7.1 Corruption and rent-seeking
Corruption is bad for growth. A number of ways that corruption retards devel-
opment have been identiﬁed in the literature. First, corruption tends to reduce
the incentive to invest by decreasing net returns and raising uncertainty. This
eﬀect impacts most heavily on increasing returns technologies with large ﬁxed
costs. Once costs are sunk, investors are subject to hold-up by corrupt oﬃcials,
who can extort large sums. Also, governments and oﬃcials who have partici-
pated in such schemes ﬁnd it diﬃcult to commit credibly to new infrastructure
projects.
Second, corruption diverts public expenditure intended for social overhead
capital. At the same time, the allocation of such capital is distorted, because
oﬃcials prefer infrastructure projects where large side payments are feasible.
Corruption also hinders the collection of tax revenue, and hence the resource
base of the government seeking to provide public infrastructure. Again, a lack
of social overhead capital such as transport and communication networks tends
to impact more heavily on the modern sector.
Third, innovators suﬀer particularly under a corrupt regime, because of their
higher need for such oﬃcial services as permits, patents and licenses (De Soto
1989; Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny 1993). The same is true for foreign in-
vestors, who bring in new technology. Lambsdorﬀ (2003) ﬁnds that on average
71 Following the excellent survey of Bardhan (1997), we deﬁne corruption to be “the
use of public oﬃce for private gains, where an oﬃcial (the agent) entrusted with
carrying out a task by the public (the principal) engages in some sort of malfeasance
for private enrichment which is diﬃcult to monitor for the principal” (Bardhan 1997,
p. 1321).
76a 10% worsening in an index of transparency and corruption he constructs
leads to a fall of 0.5 percentage points the ratio of foreign direct investment
to GDP.
Not only is corruption damaging to growth, but it also tends to breed more
corruption. In other words, there are complementarities in corruption and
other rent-seeking activities. It is this increasing returns nature of corruption
which may serve to lock in poverty. Some equilibria will be associated with
high corruption and low income, where many rent-seekers prey on relatively
few producers. Others will have the reverse.
The decision of one oﬃcial to seek bribes will increase expected net rewards to
bribe taking in several ways. The most obvious of these complementarities is
that when many agents are corrupt, the probability of detection and punish-
ment for the marginal oﬃcial is lowered. A related point is that if corruption
is rampant then detection will not entail the same loss of reputation or social
stigma as would be the case in an environment where corruption is rare. In
other words, corruption is linked to social norms, and is one of the many rea-
sons why they matter for growth. 72 Third, greater corruption tends to reduce
the search cost for new bribes.
Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) point out yet another source of potential
complementarities in rent-seeking. Their idea is that even if returns to preda-
tion are decreasing in an absolute sense, they may still be increasing relative
to production. This would occur if the returns to productive activities—the
alternative when agents make labor supply decisions—fall faster than those
to rent-seeking as the number of rent-seekers increases. The general equilib-
rium eﬀect is that greater rent-seeking decreases the (opportunity) cost of an
additional rent-seeker.
In their model there is a modern sector, where output by any individual is
equal to a, and a subsistence technology with which agents can produce output
c < a. Alternatively, agents can prey on workers, obtaining for themselves
an amount no more than b per person, but limited by the amount of output
available for predation. This in turn depends on the number of people working
in the productive sectors. The authors assume, in addition, that only modern
72 Transparency International’s 2004 Global Corruption Report cites a statement by
the president of the Government Action Observatory in Burundi that “corruption
has spread, openly and publicly, to such an extent that those who practice it have
become stronger than those who are ﬁghting against it. This has led to a kind of
reversal of values.” (Emphasis added.)
77c < b < a
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Fig. 27. Rewards to rent-seeking and production
sector output can be appropriated by rent-seekers, so returns to subsistence
farming are always equal to c.
An equilibrium is an allocation of labor across the diﬀerent occupations such
that returns to all are equal, and no individual agent can increase their reward
by acting unilaterally. To locate equilibria, we now discuss returns to working
in the diﬀerent sectors as a function of n, which is deﬁned to be the number
of rent seekers for each modern sector producer.
Returns to employment in the subsistence sector are always given by c. Rent-
seekers all take a slice b of the pie until their ratio to modern sector producers
n satisﬁes a − bn = c. At this ratio, which we denote ¯ n, the earnings of the
modern sector producers fall to that of the subsistence producers, and the
rent-seekers must reduce the size of their take (or earn nothing). After ¯ n, the
rent-seekers each take (a − c)/n, exactly equalizing returns to modern sector
production and subsistence.
Let p(n) and r(n) be returns to modern sector production and rent-seeking
respectively, so that p(n) = (a−bn)1{n < ¯ n}+c1{n ≥ ¯ n} and r(n) = b1{n <
¯ n} + a−c
n 1{n ≥ ¯ n}. These curves are drawn in Figure 27. The ﬁgure shows
78that there are multiple equilibria whenever the parameters satisfy c < b < a.
One is where all work in the modern sector. Then n = 0, and p(n) = p(0) =
a > r(n) = b > c. This allocation is an equilibrium, where all agents earn the
relatively high revenue available from modern sector production. In addition,
because b > c, the payoﬀ functions n 7→ p(n) and n 7→ r(n) intersect above
¯ n, at n2. This is again an equilibrium, where the payoﬀs to working in the
subsistence sector, the modern sector and the rent-seeking sector are all equal
and given by c.
Notice that b does not aﬀect income in either of these two equilibria. However,
it does aﬀect which one is likely to prevail. If b declines below c, for example,
then only the good equilibrium will remain. If it increases above a, then the bad
equilibrium will be unique. When there are two equilibria, higher b increases
the basin of attraction for the bad equilibrium under myopic Marshallian
dynamics.
In summary, the model exhibits a general equilibrium complementarity to
corruption, which helps illustrate why corruption tends to be self-reinforcing,
therefore causing poverty to persist. These kind of stories are important, be-
cause in practice corruption and related crimes tend to show a great deal of
variation across time and space, often without obvious exogenous characteris-
tics that would cause such variation.
There are many other models which exhibit self-reinforcement and path de-
pendence in corruption. One is Tirole (1996), who studies the evolution of
individual and group reputation. In his model, past behavior provides infor-
mation about traits, such as honesty, ability and diligence. However, individual
behavior is not perfectly observed. As a result, actions of the group or cohort
to which the individual belongs have predictive power when trying to infer the
traits of the individual. It follows that outcomes and hence incentives for the
individual are aﬀected by the actions of the group.
In this case we can imagine the following scenario. Young agents progressively
joint an initial cohort of workers, a large number of whom are known to be
corrupt. Because the behavior of new agents is imperfectly observed, they
inherit the suspicion which already falls on the older workers. As a result,
they may have little incentive to act honestly, and drift easily to corruption.
This outcome in turn perpetuates the group’s reputation for corrupt action.
One can contemplate many more such feedback mechanisms. For example, it
is often said that the low wages of petty oﬃcials drive them to corruption. But
if corruption lowers national output and hence income, then this will reduce
79the tax base, which in turn decreases the amount of resources with which to
pay wages. For further discussion of corruption and poverty traps see Bardhan
(1997). 73
7.2 Kinship systems
All countries and economies are made up of people who at one time were
organized in small tribes with their own experiences, customs, taboos and
conventions. Over time these tribes were united into cities, states and coun-
tries; and the economies within which they operated grew larger and more
sophisticated. Some of these economies became vibrant and strong. Others
have stagnated. According to North (1993, p. 4),
The reason for diﬀering success is straightforward. The complexity of the environ-
ment increased as human beings became increasingly interdependent, and more
complex institutional structures were necessary to capture the potential gains
from trade. Such evolution required that the society develop institutions that will
permit anonymous, impersonal exchange across time and space. But to the extent
that “local experience” had produced diverse mental models and institutions with
respect to the gains from such cooperation, the likelihood of creating the neces-
sary institutions to capture the gains from trade of more complex contracting
varied.
North and other development thinkers have emphasized that success depends
on institutions rewarding eﬃcient, productive activity; and having suﬃcient
ﬂexibility to cope with the structural changes experienced in the transition to
modernity. The degree of ﬂexibility and ability to adapt determines to what
extent an economy can take advantage of the application of science, of new
techniques, and of specialization and the eﬀective division of labor.
To illustrate these ideas, in this section we review recent analysis of the “kin”
system, an institution found in many traditional societies, usually deﬁned
as an informal set of shared rights and obligations between extended family
and friends for the purpose of mutual assistance. 74 Where markets and state
institutions are less developed, the kin system replaces formal insurance and
73 For other kinds of poverty traps arising through interactions between the state
and markets, see, for example, Hoﬀ and Stiglitz (2004), or Gradstein (2004).
74 A related form of local poverty traps is those generated by neighborhood eﬀects.
See Durlauf (2004).
80social security by implementing various forms of community risk sharing, and
by the provision of other social services (Hoﬀ and Sen 2004). The question we
ask in the remainder of this section is how, in the process of development, the
kin system interacts with the nascent modern sector, and whether or not it
may serve to impede the diﬀusion of new technologies and the exploitation of
gains from trade.
An interesting example of such analysis is Baker (2004), who interprets Africa’s
lack of robust growth as a failure of technology diﬀusion caused by institutional
barriers. She presents a model of a rural African village, and suggests two
path dependent mechanisms related to the kin system which may serve to
retard growth. Both of them involve community risk sharing, and indicate how
technology adoption may have positive network externalities beyond simple
social learning.
The ﬁrst mechanism concerns risk sharing among kin members in the form of
interest free “loans” with no ﬁxed repayment schedule. Kin members in need
can expect to receive these transfers from the better oﬀ, who in turn must com-
ply or face various social sanctions (including, in the countries Baker studied,
accusations of witchcraft as the source of their good fortune). Beyond the ob-
vious incentive eﬀects on those who might seek to improve their circumstances
by using new technology, Baker suggests that a kin member who adopts new
techniques may face signiﬁcant additional uncertainty vis-a-vis income net of
transfers if the kin group makes mistakes in estimating his or her true prof-
its. Such a miscalculation may lead to excessive demands for “gifts” or other
transfers.
As Baker points out, the uncertainty eﬀect of the transfers will be larger for
those who adopt new technology, where costs and revenue are harder for the
other kin to estimate. For example, the kin may have diﬃculty in measuring
the real costs of new techniques, such as fertilizer or more expensive seed,
causing them to overestimate true proﬁts. (New techniques are often associated
with higher revenues combined with higher costs.)
On the other hand, cost and net proﬁt will be easier to estimate if more kin
members have experience of the new techniques. In other words, uncertainty
will be mitigated for the marginal adopter if more of his or her fellow kin
members adopt the same technology. As a result there are positive network
externalities in terms of expected cost. This mechanism generates a coordina-
tion problem, whereby a critical mass of co-adopters may be necessary to make
the new technology more attractive than the old. This need for coordination
81may present a barrier to adoption.
At the same time, the coordination barrier would not seem to be insurmount-
able. Perhaps a kin group can negotiate to a better equilibrium when the gains
are genuinely large? Baker suggests that in fact this will not be easy, because
the risk sharing problem interacts with other path dependent institutions.
One of these concerns the nature of old age insurance among self-employed
African farmers. Given the lack of state pensions and the diﬃculty of accu-
mulating assets, support in old age may be contingent on the old providing
some form of useful service to the household from which resources are to be
acquired. And the most likely candidate for productive service from elderly
farmers is the beneﬁt of their experience. The problem here is that the value
of this service provided by the old depends on a stagnant technology which
does not change from generation to generation. Under new techniques the
experience of old farmers may become redundant. If old farmers are able to
resist the introduction of new techniques then it will be in their interests to
do so. Once again, this is a source of multiple equilibria. The reason is that
if the newer technology were already adopted then presumably it would be
supported by old farmers, because this is then the methodology in which they
have experience.
Another interesting study of the kin system has been conducted recently by
Hoﬀ and Sen (2004). They analyze the migration of kin members from ru-
ral areas to modern sector jobs, and show how network externalities arise in
the migration decision. Even if kin members can coordinate on simultaneous
migration, Hoﬀ and Sen suggest that the kin group may put up barriers to pre-
vent the loss of their most productive members. It is shown that even when
the kin decisions are made by a majority, the barriers can be ineﬃcient in
terms of aggregate group welfare.
A simpliﬁed version of their story runs as follows. Kin members who do migrate
may ﬁnd themselves besieged by their less fortunate brethren. The latter come
seeking not only “gifts” of cash transfers, but also help in ﬁnding jobs in the
modern sector for themselves. Realizing this, employers will ﬁnd it proﬁtable
to restrict employment of kin members. Here we assume these barriers are so
high that migration while maintaining kin ties is never optimal. As a result,
kin members choose between remaining in the rural sector or migrating while
breaking their kin ties.
The kin group is thought of as a continuum of members with total mass of
one. A fraction ¯ α ∈ (0,1) of the kin receive job oﬀers in the modern sector.
82The utility of remaining in the rural sector is
us(α) = s0 + b(1 − α), (29)
where here and elsewhere α ≤ ¯ α is the fraction of the kin who break ties and
move. The constant s0 is a stand-alone payoﬀ to rural occupation. The con-
stant b is positive, so that utility of staying is higher when more kin members
remain. On the other hand, the utility of moving to the modern sector is
um(α) = m0 − c(1 − α), (30)
where m0 is a payoﬀ to working in the modern sector and c is a positive
constant. The function α 7→ c(1 − α) is the cost of ending kin membership
(measured in the utility equivalent of various social sanctions which we will
not describe). It is assumed that the cost of breaking kin ties for the marginal
kin member decreases as more members leave the kin group and shift to the
modern sector. 75
Consider the interesting case, where um(0) < us(0) and um(¯ α) > us(¯ α). A pair
of curves for (29) and (30) which ﬁt this pattern are depicted in Figure 28. If
no kin members take modern sector jobs then it is not optimal to do so for an
individual member. On the other hand, if all those with oﬀers take up jobs,
then their utility payoﬀ will be higher than the payoﬀ of those who remain.
If, as in the ﬁgure, we also have um(¯ α) > us(0), then it seems plausible that
the kin members with job oﬀers will coordinate their way to the equilibrium
where all simultaneously move to modern sector jobs. Kin groups are not as
diﬀuse as some other groups of economic actors, and coordination should prove
correspondingly less problematic.
However, Hoﬀ and Sen show that when kin members are heterogenous, a
majority may take steps to forestall coordination by the productive critical
mass on movement to the modern sector. Moreover, they may do so even
when this choice is ineﬃcient in terms of the kin’s aggregate group payoﬀ. In
doing so, the kin group becomes a “dysfunctional institution,” responsible for
enforcing an ineﬃcient status quo.
75 Hoﬀ and Sen cite Platteau (2000), who writes that to leave and enter the modern
sector, a kin member “needs the protection aﬀorded by the deviant actions of a
suﬃcient number of other innovators in his locality. Rising economic opportunities
alone will usually not suﬃce to generate dynamic entrepreneurs in the absence of a
critical mass of cultural energies harnessed towards countering social resistance...”
(Emphasis added.)
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Their example works as follows. Consider a two stage game. First, the kin set
the exit cost parameter c by majority vote. The two possible values are ca
and cb, where ca < cb. Next, job oﬀers are received, and kin members decide
whether or not to move. Coordination always takes place in the situation where
those with job oﬀers together have a higher payoﬀ in the modern sector.
There are now two types of kin members, those with high “ability” and those
with low. The ﬁrst type are of measure γ, and have probability αH of getting
a job oﬀer from the modern sector. The second type are of measure 1 − γ,
and have probability αL of getting a job oﬀer from the modern sector, where
0 < αL < αH < 1. We assume that γ < 1/2, so high ability types are in the
minority. Also, we assume that γαH +(1−γ)αL = ¯ α. Ex post, the law of large
numbers implies that the fraction of kin members who get job oﬀers will again
be ¯ α.
Regarding parameters, we assume that ua
m(α) := m0 − ca(1 − α) satisﬁes
ua
m(¯ α) > us(0), but ub
m(α) := m0 −cb(1−α) satisﬁes ub
m(¯ α) < us(0). The ﬁrst
inequality says that under the low cost regime, the payoﬀ to working in the
modern sector is greater than that of staying if all with job oﬀers move. The
second inequality says that under the high cost regime the opposite is true.
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Because of coordination, under ca all of those with job oﬀers will move. The
ex ante payoﬀ of the high ability types is
π
a
H := αHu
a
m(¯ α) + (1 − αH)us(¯ α),
while that of low ability types is
π
a
L := αLu
a
m(¯ α) + (1 − αL)us(¯ α).
Under cb all remain in the traditional sector, so the payoﬀs are πb
L := us(0) =:
πb
H. Ex ante aggregate welfare measured as the sum of total payoﬀs is given
under ca by
Π
a := ¯ αu
a
m(¯ α) + (1 − ¯ α)us(¯ α).
Under cb it is Πb := us(0).
What Hoﬀ and Sen point out is that under some parameters it is possible to
have
π
a
L < us(0) = π
b
L = π
b
H = Π
b < Π
a < π
a
H. (31)
In this case πa
L < us(0) = πb
L, and since those with low ability are in the
majority they will choose to set c = cb. But then aggregate welfare is reduced,
85because Πb < Πa. This situation is illustrated in Figure 29. 76 Incentives are
such that the kinship institution perpetuates a low average income status quo.
8 Other Mechanisms
The poverty trap literature is vast, and even in a survey of this size many
models must be neglected. A few of the more egregious omissions are listed in
this section.
One of the earliest streams of literature on poverty traps is that related to
endogenous fertility. A classic contribution is Nelson (1956), who shows how
persistent underdevelopment can result from demographics. In his model, any
increase in income lowers the death rate, which increases population and lowers
capital stock per worker. If the population eﬀect is stronger than diminishing
returns then capital per worker cannot rise. See Azariadis (1996, Section 3.4)
for other mechanisms and more references.
Other kinds of traps that arise in convex economies with complete markets
include impatience traps and technology traps. Impatience traps typically in-
volve subsistence levels of consumption, and sensitivity of consumption to
income at low levels. See Magill and Nishimura (1984) or Azariadis (1996, Sec-
tion 3.1). Technology traps are associated with low degrees of substitutability
between capital and labor. See Azariadis (1996, Section 3.2).
See Dasgupta and Ray (1986) or Dasgupta (2003) for an introduction to the lit-
erature on malnutrition and underdevelopment. See also Basu and Van (1998)
for a model of child labor with multiple equilibria.
9 Conclusions
The poor countries are not rich because they have failed to adopt the modern
techniques of production which ﬁrst emerged in Britain during the Industrial
Revolution and then spread to some other nations in Western Europe and
elsewhere. As a result, their economies have stagnated. By contrast, the rich
countries possess market environments where the same techniques have been
76 The parameters are s0 = 0.8, b = 0.2, m0 = 2, ca = 1.1, cb = 2.3, αH = 0.9,
αL = 0.1 and γ = 0.45.
86continuously reﬁned, upgraded and extended, leading to what are now striking
disparities between themselves and the poor.
Why would techniques not be adopted even when they are more eﬃcient? Is it
not the case that more eﬃcient techniques are more proﬁtable? The main ob-
jective of this survey has been to review a large number of studies which show
why self-reinforcing traps may prevent the adoption of new technologies. For
example, Section 5 showed how increasing returns can generate an incentive
structure whereby agents avoid starting modern sector businesses, or invest
little in their own training. Section 6 focused on credit market imperfections.
Poor individuals lack collateral, which restricts their ability to raise funds. As
a result, projects with large ﬁxed costs are beyond the means of the poor,
leaving them locked in low return occupations such as subsistence farming.
Recently many economists have highlighted the role of institutions in perpet-
uating poverty. Section 7 looked at why rent-seeking is both bad for growth
and yet strongly self-reinforcing. Essentially similar societies may exhibit very
diﬀerent levels of predation simply as a result of historical accident, or some
spontaneous coordination of beliefs. In addition, the role of kinship systems
was analyzed as representative of the kinds of social conventions which may
potentially harm formation of the modern sector.
Together, these mechanisms add up to a very diﬀerent picture of development
than the convex neoclassical benchmark model on which so much of modern
growth theory has been based. Growth is not automatic. Small initial diﬀer-
ences are magniﬁed and then propagated through time. Poverty coexists with
riches, much as it is observed to do in the cross-country income panel.
9.1 Lessons for economic policy
There is a real sense in which poverty trap models are optimistic. Poverty is not
the result of some simple geographic or cultural determinism. The poor are not
condemned to poverty by a set of unfavorable exogenous factors, or even a lack
of resources. Temporary policy shocks will have large and permanent eﬀects
if one-oﬀ interventions can cause the formation of new and better equilibria.
In practice, however, engineering the emergence of more eﬃcient equilibria
seems problematic for a number of reasons. First, we have seen many exam-
ples of how bad equilibria can be stable and self-reinforcing. In this case small
policy changes are not enough to escape from their grip. Large changes must
87be made to the environment that people face, and the structure of their incen-
tives. Such changes may be resisted by the forces that have perpetuated the
ineﬃcient equilibrium, such as a corrupt state apparatus ﬁghting to preserve
the status quo.
Second, coordinating changes in expectations and the status quo is diﬃcult
because norms and conventions are highly persistent. While it is possible to
change policy and legislation almost instantaneously, it needs to be remem-
bered that informal norms and conventions are often more important in gov-
erning behavior than the formal legalistic ones. Informal norms cannot be
changed in the manner of interest rates, say, or tariﬀs. Rather they are deter-
mined within the system, and perpetuated by those forces that made them a
stable part of the economy’s institutional framework.
Third, policies can create new problems as a result of perverse incentives. 77
Successful policies will need to be carefully targeted, and operate more on the
level of incentives than compulsion. These kinds of policies require a great
deal of information. Traps which prevent growth and prosperity cannot be
overcome without proper understanding and the careful design of policy.
A Technical Appendix
Section A.1 gives a general discussion of Markov chains and ergodicity. The
proof of Proposition 3.1 is outlined. Section A.2 gives remaining proofs.
A.1 Markov chains and ergodicity
In the survey we repeatedly made use of a simple framework for treating
Markov chains and ergodicity. The following is an elementary review. Our end
77 For example, in South Korea the state is generally credited with solving many of
the coordination problems associated with industrialization in that country through
their organization and support of large industrial conglomerates, and through active
policy-based lending. However, these actions also led to a moral hazard problem,
as the industrial groups became highly leveraged with government-backed loans.
In the 1970s, investment was increasingly characterized by a costly combination
of duplication and poor choices. Losses were massive, and motivated subsequent
liberalization.
88objective is to sketch the proof of Proposition 3.1, but the review is intended
to be more generally applicable.
Consider ﬁrst a discrete time dynamical system evolving in state space S ⊂ Rn.
Just as for deterministic systems on S, which are represented by a transition
rule associating each point in S with another point in S—the value of the state
next period—a Markov chain is represented by a rule associating each point
in S with a probability distribution over S. From this conditional distribution
(i.e., distribution conditional on the current state x ∈ S) the next period
state is drawn. In what follows the conditional distribution will be denoted by
Γ(x,dy), where x ∈ S is the current state.
Because for Markov chains points in S are mapped into probability distribu-
tions rather than into individual points, it seems that the analytical methods
used to study the evolution of these processes must be fundamentally diﬀerent
to those used to study deterministic discrete time systems. But this is not the
case: Markov chains can always be reduced to deterministic systems.
To see this, note that since the state variable xt is now a random variable, it
must have some (marginal) distribution on S, which we call ψt. Suppose, as is
often the case in economics, that ψt is a density on S, and that the distribution
Γ(x,dy) is in fact a density Γ(x,y)dy for every x ∈ S. In that case the marginal
distribution for xt+1 is a density ψt+1, and ψt+1(y) =
R
S Γ(x,y)ψt(x)dx. This
last equality is just a version of the law of total probability: The probability
of ending up at y is equal to the probability of going to y via x, weighted by
the probability of being at x now, summed over all x ∈ S.
Now deﬁne map M: D → D, where D := {ϕ ∈ L1(S)|ϕ ≥ 0 and
R
ϕ = 1}
is the space of densities on S, by
M: D 3 ψ 7→ (Mψ)(·) :=
Z
S
Γ(x,·)ψ(x)dx ∈ D. (A.1)
With this deﬁnition our law of total probability rule for linking ψt+1 and ψt can
be written simply as ψt+1 = Mψt. Since the map M is deterministic, we have
succeeded in transforming our stochastic system into a deterministic system
to which standard methods of analysis may be applied. The only diﬃculty is
that the state space is now D rather than S. The latter is ﬁnite dimensional,
while the former clearly is not.
The map M is usually called the stochastic operator or Markov operator
associated with Γ. There are many good expositions of Markov operators in
economics, including Stokey, Lucas and Prescott (1989) and Futia (1982).
89However those expositions treat the more general case, where Γ(x,dy) does
not necessarily have a density representation. Here it does, and it turns out
that this extra structure is very useful for treating the models in this survey.
We wish to know when the diﬀerence equation ψt+1 = Mψt has ﬁxed points,
and, more speciﬁcally, whether the system is globally stable in the sense that
there is a unique ﬁxed point ψ∗, and ψt = Mtψ0 → ψ∗ as t → ∞ for all
ψ0 ∈ D. 78 This is just ergodicity in the sense of Deﬁnition 3.1 on page 18.
Let k·k be the L1 norm. Were M a uniform (Banach) contraction on D, which
is to say that ∃λ < 1 with kMψ − Mψ0k ≤ λkψ − ψ0k for all ψ,ψ0 ∈ D, then
ergodicity would hold because D is a closed subset of the complete metric space
L1(S). Sadly, for continuous state Markov chains this uniform contraction
property rarely holds. However it is often the case that M satisﬁes a weaker
contraction condition:
Deﬁnition A.1 Let T : X → X, where (X,d) is a metric space. The map T
is called a T2 contraction if d(Tx,Tx0) < d(x,x0) for every x 6= x0 in X.
T2 contractions maps distinct points strictly closer together. A suﬃcient con-
dition for M: D → D to satisfy the T2 property is given below. The essential
requirement is communication across all regions of the state space. Although
T2 contractions do not always have ﬁxed points (examples in R are easy to
construct), they do if the state space is compact! In fact if X is a compact set
and T : X → X is a T2 contraction then T has unique ﬁxed point x∗ ∈ X and
T tx → x∗ as t → ∞ for all x ∈ X. This is just what we require for ergodicity
when M is thought of as a map on D.
Now D is not itself a compact set in the L1 norm topology, but it may be the
case that every orbit (Mtψ0)t≥0 of M is compact when taken with its closure.
(From now on, call a set with compact closure precompact). Such a property
is called Lagrange stability. 79 And it turns out that Lagrange stability can
substitute for compactness of the state space D: If M is (a) a T2 contraction,
and (b) Lagrange stable, then the associated Markov chain is ergodic. 80
How to establish Lagrange stability? To check precompactness of orbits it
78 Here Mt is t compositions of M with itself, and ψ0 is the marginal distribution
of x0, so iterating the diﬀerence equation backwards gives ψt = Mtψ0.
79 That is, a self-mapping T on topological space X is called Lagrange stable if the
set {Ttx| t ≥ 0} is precompact for every x ∈ X.
80 The proof that Lagrange stability is suﬃcient is not hard. See Stachurski (2002,
Theorem 5.2).
90seems we must look at characterizations of compactness in L1 (there is a
famous one due to Kolmogorov), but Lasota (1994, Theorem 4.1) has proved
that one need only check weak precompactness. 81 In fact it is suﬃcient to
check weak precompactness of orbits starting from ψ ∈ D0, where D0 is a
(norm) dense subset of D. Weak compactness is much easier to work with
than norm compactness. Several well-known conditions are available.
Using one such condition due to Dunford and Pettis, Mirman, Reﬀett and
Stachurski (2004) show that Lasota’s criterion for Lagrange stability is satis-
ﬁed when (i) there exists a continuous “norm-like” function V : S → R and
constants α,β ∈ [0,∞), α < 1, such that
Z
Γ(x,y)V (y)dy ≤ αV (x) + β, ∀x ∈ S; (A.2)
and (ii) there exists a continuous function h: S → R such that supx∈S Γ(x,y) ≤
h(y) for all y ∈ S. By V being norm-like is meant that V is nonnegative, and
that the sets {x ∈ S : V (x) ≤ a} are precompact for all a. (For example, when
S = Rn it is easy to convince yourself that x 7→ kxk is norm-like. Note that
when S is a proper subset of Rn precompactness of sublevel sets refers to the
relative Euclidean topology on S.)
Condition (i) is a standard drift condition, which pushes probability mass to-
wards the center of the state space. This implies that orbits of the Markov
process will be “tight.” Tightness is a component of Dunford and Pettis’ cri-
terion for weak precompactness. Condition (ii) is just a technical condition
which combines with (i) to ﬁll out the requirements of the Dunford-Pettis
criterion.
In the case of Proposition 3.1, we can take S = (0,∞), where 0 / ∈ S so that
any stationary distribution we ﬁnd is automatically nontrivial. One can then
show that V (x) = |lnx| is norm-like on S, and a little bit of algebra shows
that condition (i) holds for Γ given in (10). Also, one can show that (ii) holds
when h(y) := 1/y. 82
This takes care of Lagrange stability. Regarding T2 contractiveness, one can
show that M is a T2 contraction whenever the set suppMψ ∩ suppMψ0 has
positive measure for all ψ,ψ0 ∈ D, where suppf := {x ∈ S |f(x) 6= 0}. This
81 Here is where the density structure is crucial. The operator M inherits nice prop-
erties from the fact that Γ(x,dy) has a density representation. Also, we can work
in L1 rather than a space of measures. The former has a nice norm-dual space in
L∞—helpful when dealing with weak precompactness.
82 For more details see Stachurski (2004).
91basically says that probability mass is mixed across the state space—all areas
of S communicate. In the case of (10) it is easy to show that suppMψ =
(0,∞) = S for every ψ ∈ D. This is clearly suﬃcient for the condition.
A.2 Remaining proofs
The proof of Proposition 5.1 in Section 5.2 is now given. The ﬁrst point is that
the banks b = 1,...,B−1 are equal-cost Bertrand competitors, and as a result
always oﬀer the interest rate r to all ﬁrms in equilibrium. The main issue is
the optimal strategy of the last bank B. So consider the following strategy σ∗
B
for B, which is illustrated with the help of Figure A.1. To ﬁrm n the bank
oﬀers i∗
n deﬁned by i∗
n = f[(n−1)/N]−1 if n ≤ αCN. To the remaining ﬁrms
B oﬀers the interest rate r. (Without loss of generality, we suppose that the
index of ﬁrms from 1 to N and the ranking of the oﬀers made by B always
coincide.) Let σ∗ ∈ Σ be the strategy where B oﬀers σ∗
B and all other banks
oﬀer r.
For the strategy σ∗ we have Ω(σ∗) = {1}. The reason is that for α = n/N ≤
αC, ﬁrms j = 1,...,n + 1 all satisfy
π(n/N,mj(σ
∗)) ≥ π(n/N,i
∗
j) ≥ π(n/N,i
∗
n+1) = 0.
In which case α / ∈ Ω(σ∗) by (20). Also, for α ∈ (αC,1) we have π(α,mn(σ∗)) ≥
π(α,r) ≥ 0 for all n ∈ {1,...,N}, so again α / ∈ Ω(σ∗). For the same reason,
1 ∈ Ω(σ∗), because π(1,mn(σ∗)) ≥ π(1,r) ≥ 0.
It follows that under this strategy αpes(σ∗) = 1. By (19) all ﬁrms enter. The
proﬁts of bank B are given by the sum of the regions P, Q and R, minus the
region O, in Figure A.1. Here Q and ¯ α are chosen so that P +Q−O = 0. Thus,
¯ α is the break-even point for the bank, where it recoups all losses made by
oﬀering cheap loans to ﬁrms in the “critical mass” region [0,αC]. If `/N ≥ ¯ α
and hence R ≥ 0, the bank B makes positive proﬁts.
It is not too hard to see that σ∗ is indeed the optimal strategy in Σ for the
banks. The banks b = 1,...,B−1 always oﬀer r. For B, strategy σ∗
B is optimal
for the following reasons. First, if B oﬀers interest rates to n ∈ {1,...,N}
which are all less than or equal to those in σ∗
B, then all ﬁrms will enter as
above, but B will make lower proﬁts by (17). So suppose that B oﬀers a
schedule of rates {i∗∗
1 ,...,i∗∗
N} where i∗∗
n > i∗
n for at least one n, and let k be
the ﬁrst such n. It is not diﬃcult to see that the chain of logic whereby all
ﬁrms enter now unravels: It must be that k/N ≤ αC, because to other ﬁrms
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Fig. A.1. Coordination by the lead bank
B oﬀers the rate r, which cannot be exceeded due to B’s competitors. One
can now check that (k − 1)/N ∈ Ω(σ∗∗), and in fact (k − 1)/N = minΩ(σ∗∗).
As a result, αpes(σ∗∗) = (k−1)/N, and precisely k−1 ﬁrms enter. Clearly the
proﬁts of B are lower for σ∗∗ than for σ∗.
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